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FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE 
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF INTERNAL MILITARY DECI-
SIONS: THE NINTH CIRCUIT ADOPTS MINDES AND 
ECONOMOU 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Wallace v. Chappell,! the Ninth Circuit adopted the 
Mindes2 standard for judicial reviewability of internal adminis-
trative military decisions. The court held that violations of mili-
tary personnel's "recognized"s constitutional rights, arising from 
internal military decisions, entitles them to a district court de-
termination of whether such claims can be judicially reviewed. 
Once found reviewable, the military official charged will gener-
ally· enjoy qualified immunity for acts performed in good faith. 
Before seeking judicial review, plaintiffs must also demonstrate 
exhaustion of available intraservice remedies. & 
This action originated when five black enlisted men charged 
their superior officers with racial discrimination. The coinplaint 
alleged that the defendants had assigned plaintiffs to the least 
desirable duties, had excluded them from training programs, had 
given them low performance evaluations, and had excessively 
punished them for minor transgressions. Plaintiffs claimed viola-
1. 661 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Fletcher, J.; the other panel members were 
Goodwin, J., and Hug, J.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 486 (1982). 
2. Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971). 
3. "Recognized", as a qualification upon the Mindes test was established in Calhoun 
v. United States, 475 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd, 604 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980). The Calhoun court used this term because many so-called 
"constitutional violations" are nothing more than ordinary torts to which state tort law 
or the Federal Tort Claims Act applies. 475 F. Supp. at 5. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 
U.S. 693 (1976); Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
4. The term "generally" is used here because, as the court observed, the possibility 
of absolute immunity exists if the official charged can demonstrate performance of "spe-
cial functions". 661 F.2d at 735. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978). See 
also text accompanying notes 65-71 infra. 
5. 661 F.2d at 738. 
249 
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tions of both the equal protection component of the fifth amend-
ment due process clauses and 42 U.S.C. section 1985(3).7 
The district court held that internal military decisions are 
nonreviewable; that defendants' absolute immunity protected 
them from liability even if reviewable; and, that plaintiffs had 
failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The Ninth Circuit re-
versed, distinguishing the two basic substantive issues 
presented: judicial reviewability of internal military decisions, 
and official immunity if found reviewable.s The court observed 
that if the military decision involved is found nonreviewable, the 
immunity issue is moot.s If the military decision is found review-
able, however, the immunity question arises only when an indi-
vidual officer is, as here, sued for money damages.1o After deter-
mining that the instant action satisfied both substantive 
questions, the case was remanded to the district court for recon-
sideration to determine whether plaintiffs' claims satisfied the 
Mindes standard. 
6. 1d. at 730 n.l. Technically, the constitutional violation for which the officers were 
charged was fifth amendment due process. The reason plaintiffs did not sue under the 
fourteenth amendment was that, heretofor in damage suits, only alleged violations of the 
fourth and fifth amendments have been recognized. See supra note 3, infra note 10. 
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1981) provides in pertinent part: 
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire 
... for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, 
any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the 
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or 
for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted au-
thorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to 
all persons within such State or Territory, the equal protec-
tion of the laws;. . . in any case of conspiracy set forth in this 
section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to 
be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspir-
acy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or 
deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a 
citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived 
may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by 
such injury or deprivation, against anyone or more of the 
conspirators. 
8. 661 F.2d at 731. 
9. 1d. at 734. 
10. The question arises whether the type of injury sustained by plaintiffs is nor-
mally compensable in damages. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed-
eral Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), in which the Supreme Court held that an 
aggrieved party may bring a damages action against federal officials based directly on 
violations of the fourth amendment. Bivens was extended to fifth amendment equal pro-
tection claims in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979). 
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Because of the Ninth Circuit's holding, the court did not 
rule on the exhaustion issue, but' stated that upon remand, 
plaintiffs must demonstrate that they had exhausted available 
intraservice remedies before trial could proceed.11 
B. BACKGROUND 
Reviewability 
The starting point for considering the question of judicial 
reviewability of administrative decisions is Orloff v. Wil-
loughby,12 where the Supreme Court held that it had no power 
to review a military determination regarding duty assignments. IS 
The Willoughby opinion expressed the basic policy concerns be-
hind the doctrine of nonreviewability. In a frequently quoted 
passage, the Court stated: 
[J]udges are not given the task of running the 
Army. The responsibility for setting up channels 
through which such grievances can be considered 
and fairly settled rests upon the Congress and 
upon the President of the United States and his 
subordinates. . . . Orderly government requires 
that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to inter-
fere with legitimate Army matters as the Army 
must be scrupulous not to intervene in judicial 
matters. 14 
The Willoughby rulelll illustrates two widely held policy 
concerns present in the nineteenth and first half of the twenti-
eth centuries. Primarily, the rule represents the principle of sep-
11. 661 F.2d at 738. 
12. 345 U.S. 83 (1953). The Willoughby case arose out of the doctor shortage during 
the Korean War. Orloff, a doctor who had been inducted under the Doctor's Draft Law, 
Universal Military Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 454(i) (1981), brought a 
habeas corpus action to require assignment to medical duties which the Army refused 
because of Orloff's unwillingness to answer questions regarding his previous affiliation 
with the Communist Party. 
13. 345 U.s. at 91. The Court's decision was stated in absolute terms: "[I)t is not 
within the power of this Court by habeas corpus to determine whether specific assign-
ments to duty fall within the basic classification of petitioner. . . . [W)e have found no 
case where this Court has assumed to revise duty orders as to one lawfully in the ser-
vice." Id. at 93-94. 
14.Id. 
15. The doctrine of nonreviewability for administrative military decisions will here-
inafter be referred to as the "Willoughby rule". For an excellent discussion on the pre-
Mindes doctrine of nonreviewability, see Montgomery, God, The Army and Judicial Re-
view: The In-service Conscientious Objector, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 379 (1968). 
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aration of powers. In 1857, in Dynes v. Hoover,16 the Supreme 
Court held that under Articles I and II of the Constitution,17 
military courts were agencies of the Executive and Legislative 
branches, not the Judiciary.18 
The second underlying policy concern was the necessity of 
military autonomy to maintain internal discipline and order. In 
the 1840 case of Decatur v. Paulding,IS the Supreme Court 
stated: "The interference of the courts with the performance of 
the ordinary duties of the executive departments of the govern-
ment, would be productive of nothing but mischief .... "20 
Considering the well established "hands off" attitude of the 
federal judiciary, it becomes easier to understand why the courts 
have been reluctant to review military decisions. This attitude 
was crystallized in the Willoughby decision. 
Since Willoughby however, this crystallization has steadily 
eroded, and the courts have become more willing to review mili-
tary decisions. In Harmon v. Brucker,21 the Supreme Court dra-
matically departed from the Willoughby rule. The Harmon 
Court held that the federal courts do have jurisdiction to review 
administrative discharge actions to determine whether the Sec-
retary of the Army has acted in excess of his statutory author-
ity.12 The Court stated: "Generally, judicial relief is available to 
one who has been injured by an act of a government official 
which is in excess of his express or implied powers."28 Although 
16. 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857). 
17. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 provides: "The President shall be Commander in Chief of 
the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States, when 
called into the actual Service of the United States .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 empow-
ers the Congress "To declare War. . . ; To raise and support Armies . . . ; To provide 
and maintain a Navy; To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land 
and naval Forces .... " 
18. "[Clivil courts have nothing to do [with military courtsl, nor are they in any way 
alterable by them." 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 82. For a more detailed discussion of this con-
cept, see Barker, Military Law-A Separate System of Jurisprudence, 36 U. elN. L. 
REV. 223 (1967). 
19. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840). 
20. Id. at 515. See also United States v. Eliason, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 291 (1842), in 
which the Supreme Court unanimously held that it is not the prerogative of the federal 
courts to review the validity of Army regulations. 
21. 355 U.S. 579 (1958). 
22. Id. at 582. 
23. Id. at 581-82. The Court relied on American School of Magnetic Healing v. 
4
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this decision involved a discharge action, it opened the door to 
judicial intervention, thereby enlarging the court's scope of re-
viewability of military actions. 
But before judicial intervention in non-discharge adminis-
trative actions could be justified, review of discharge actions re-
quired greater development. The link between discharge and 
non-discharge determinations was provided in Hammond v. 
Lenfest,24 in which the Second Circuit held that a serviceman is 
entitled to a federal court review of a military administrative de-
cision concerning a request for discharge.211 Even though this 
holding was restricted to its facts, it has been applied by analogy 
in at least one non-discharge case, Smith v. Resor.26 In that case, 
the court held that plaintiff was entitled to review of unsatisfac-
tory attendance ratings.27 
With regard to military decisions concerning orders, duty 
assignments, personnel status and other non-discharge adminis-
trative determinations however, the Willoughby rule was still 
closely followed. It was not until Mindes v. Seaman28 that there 
came a true break with the tradition of Willoughby. 
The two-part Mindes test provides a standard by which a 
trial court may consider the relevant factors to determine 
whether the particular claim warrants judicial review. Initially, a 
military decision is nonreviewable unless plaintiff alleges: (1) a 
violation of a constitutional right, applicable statute, or military 
regulation, and, (2) the exhaustion of available intraservice 
remedies.29 
McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902). The McAnnulty decision-a major departure from 
Dynes and Decatur-held that, in the absence of statutory prohibition, an administra-
tive determination is reviewable. [d. at 108. See supra text accompanying notes 16-20. 
24. 398 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1968). Hammond, a Navy reservist, filed for a conscien-
tious objector discharge which was denied. He then applied for a writ of habeas corpus in 
the district court which was also denied, the court claiming lack of jurisdiction. The 
Second Circuit reversed. 
25. [d. at 715. 
26. 406 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1969). 
27. [d. at 146-47. 
28. 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971). Mindes, an Air Force captain, received an unfavor-
able and erroneous Officer Effectiveness Report which resulted in his separation from 
active duty. After exhausting available intraservice remedies, ending in denial of relief, 
he sought correction in the district court. [d. at 198. 
29. [d. at 201; Wallace, 661 F.2d at 732. 
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The second step requires that the trial court weigh four fac-
tors to determine whether review should be granted: 
(1) The nature and strength of plaintiff's claim. As the 
Mindes Court recognized, constitutional claims gener-
ally carry greater weight than statutory or regulatory 
claims. But even constitutional claims can vary widely, 
and tenuous constitutional challenges should be 
weighed against review. so 
(2) The potential injury to plaintiff if review is refused.s1 
(3) The extent of interference with military functions. 
Some degree of interference will always exist, but this 
fact alone should not bar review. If however, the ex-
tent of interference should seriously impede the ability 
of the military to perform its functions, then review 
should be denied.81 
(4) The extent to which military expertise or discretion is 
involved. In such matters as promotions and orders di-
rectly related to military functions, deference should 
be given to the superior knowledge of the military.ss 
The Mindes test had been applied although not expressly 
adopted by the Ninth Circuit prior to Wallace. In Schlanger u. 
United States,S4 the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court deci-
sion which, after applying the Mindes test, denied review and 
dismissed the complaint on other grounds. In Glines u. Wade,slI 
the court recognized that the test had been considered in 
Schlanger, and that if it was controlling, plaintiff would satisfy 
it. 
Immunity 
An issue separate from reviewability is that of official immu-
nity. The Ninth Circuit in Wallace was careful to distinguish 
30. 453 F.2d at 201. 
31. [d. 
32. [d. 
33. [d. at 201-02. 
34. 586 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 943 (1979). The Ninth Cir-
cuit recognized the potential applicability of Mindes in Schlanger, but rejected the test 
because the same result could be reached by denying review of all military decisions 
involving duty assignments. See 661 F.2d at 733 n.4; Ct. Arnheifer v. Chafee, 435 F.2d 
691 (9th Cir. 1970). 
35. 586 F.2d 675 n.4. (9th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Brown v. 
Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980). 
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between the two issues since the immunity issue becomes rele-
vant only after the action has been found reviewable.36 The 
question of official immunity has arisen in various contexts,37 
thus it was often difficult for the courts to ascertain whether 
greater immunity protected one but perhaps not another official. 
This question has been largely answered by the Supreme Court 
decision of Butz v. Economou,3B which held that federal officials 
exercising discretion enjoy only qualified immunity from liability 
for constitutional violations.89 
To appreciate better the Economou decision however, a dis-
cussion of the history preceding it is necessary. The Supreme 
Court's first opportunity to consider the question of sovereign 
immunity4° came in 1896 in Spalding v. Vilas.41 The traditional 
rationale behind sovereign immunity was that the authority em-
powered with making the law should not, without its consent, be 
subject to the legal rights created by it.4I The Court granted to 
the Postmaster General absolute immunity while acting within 
the scope of his authority.43 
The notion of sovereign immunity became further engraved 
into the common law in Feres v. United States.44 This case 
36. 661 F.2d at 734. 
37. See, e.g., GibBon v. Reynolds, 172 F.2d 95 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 925 
(1949) (state Director of Selective Service and local Draft Board members immune); 
Laughlin v. Rosenman, 163 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (Special COUDsel to President and 
Special Assistant to the Attorney General immune from malicious prosecution); Glasa v. 
Ickes, 117 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 718 (1941) (Secretary of Inte-
rior immune from defamation suit); Lang v. Wood, 92 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (Attor-
ney General, parole board, warden and director of prison immune from liability for de-
nial of hearing by entire parole board and plaintiff's subsequent imprisonment because 
of parole revocation). 
38. 438 U.S. 478 (1978). 
39. [d. at 5()()-01. 
40. Sovereign immunity is a common law principle which protects governmental en-
tities from suit without their consent. It is absolute and defeats a suit at its inception for 
lack of jurisdiction. See, e.g., High-Grade Oil Co. v. Sommer, 295 N.W.2d 736, 737, 739 
(1980). 
41. 161 U.S. 483 (1896). The Postmaster General was sued for defamation for mali-
ciously distributing a circular to injure plaintiff's busine88. The Court found that the 
circular was factually accurate and was i88ued within the scope of the official's authority. 
[d. at 499. 
42. See, e.g., Kawanannakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349 (1907) (sovereign is exempt 
from suit because there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law 
on which the right depends). 
43. Spalding, 161 U.S. at 499. 
44. 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
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arose after the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act,·11 which 
allowed private citizens to seek relief from the United States for 
torts committed against them by government officials. The Feres 
Court recognized that the purpose of the Act was to help "miti-
gate unjust consequences of sovereign immunity from suit."·8 
But the Court found that the Act was not intended to extend to 
military personnel for torts committed against them by their 
superiors,·? thereby creating a military exception to liability. 
The Feres Court offered several justifications for its rule of 
absolute immunity. Primarily, it believed that a comprehensive 
system of relief already existed which adequately provided for 
wrongs committed against military and naval personnel.·8 The 
Court observed further that while acting in the line of duty, a 
military official should not be held accountable for injuries 
which might occur incident to service.·" Finally, the Court found 
persuasive the fact that states generally do not permit members 
of the state militia to maintain tort actions for injuries suffered 
incident to service. llo 
Courts have approached the question of immunity for fed-
eral officials exercising discretionary functions ll1 with great trepi-
dation. The fundamental theory of erring on the side of provid-
ing too much protection rather than not enough has evidenced 
itself repeatedly in federal court decisions. The Supreme Court 
decision of Barr v. Matteo lli is no exception. One important as-
pect evidencing the embryonic trend away from absolute immu-
nity lies in t.he fact that the Barr decision was reached by a plu-
rality, rather than a majority. Nevertheless, the Court granted 
45. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 
2411, 2412, 2671, 2672, 2674-80 (1976 & Supp. 1982). 
46. 340 U.S. at 139. 
47. [d. at 140. 
48. [d. 
49. [d. at 144. 
50. [d. at 142. 
51. A discretionary function generally is one involving judgment, planning or policy 
decisions. See, e.g., Jackson v. Kelly, 557 F.2d 735, 737 (10th Cir. 1977); Estrada v. Hills, 
401 F. Supp; 429, 436 (N.D. Ill. 1975). See also Ove Gustavson Contracting Co. v. Floete, 
299 F.2d 655, 659 (2d Cir. 1962) in which the Second Circuit stated that the test for 
discretion is: "was the act complained of the result of a judgment or decision which it is 
nece88ary that the governmental official be free to make without fear or threat of vexa-
tious or fictitious suits and alleged personal liability?" 
52. 360 U.S. 564 (1959). 
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absolute immunity from suit to a lower echelon federal executive 
official exercising discretion, for defamation committed while 
acting within the outer perimeter of his authority, and with ma-
licious motives. liS 
Absolute immunity for common law torts was extended to 
military officials as well in Barr's companion case, Howard v. 
Lyons.1l4 In that case, the Supreme Court granted absolute im-
munity to a Navy captain exercising discretionary functions, be-
cause his actions were performed in the "discharge of [his] 
official duties. "1111 
Although absolute immunity was granted to federal officials 
for alleged common law torts, the same was not necessarily true 
for alleged constitutional violations. In Dinsman v. Wilkes,1I6 the 
Supreme Court allowed only qualified immunity from liability in 
connection with an internal military decision. In this century, 
the landmark case concerning alleged constitutional violations 
by federal officials is Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of 
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. 1I7 In Bivens, the Supreme 
Court held that the FBI's violation of a person's fourth amend-
ment rights could be compensated with damages.1I8 A cause of 
action therefore exists against federal officials for deprivation of 
constitutional rights. Although the Supreme Court did not rule 
on the immunity question, on remand the Second Circuit held 
that the agents were entitled only to a qualified immunity when 
acting in good faith and with a reasonable belief in the legality 
53. [d. at 572-75. In Barr, the acting Director of the Federal Office of Rent Stabili- . 
zation was sued by its employees for defamatory statements. In a strong dissent, Justice 
Brennan criticized the majority for its lack of justification on this ruling which deprived 
private citizens of any opportunity to seek redress. [d. at 586-91. 
54. 360 U.S. 593 (1959). 
55. [d. at 598. The defendant in Howard, the commander of the Boston Naval Ship-
yard, circulated a letter claiming dissatisfaction with the Federal Employees Veterans 
Association. Civilian members of the Association sued for defamation, claiming that cir-
culating the letter to parties outside the Navy was an abusive act of his official duties. 
The Supreme Court disagreed, granting defendant absolute immunity from suit. 
56. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 390 (1851). In Dinsman, a marine brought suit against his 
commanding officer for "punishment inflicted upon him for refusing to do his duty." [d. 
at 402. The Court held that acts motivated "by an upright intention to maintain the 
discipline of command" are not actionable. [d. at 404. Therefore, qualified immunity 
applied to a defendant acting in good faith, i.e., with an "upright intention." 
57. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
58. [d. at 397. See supra note 10. 
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of the arrest. IIi 
Qualified immunity for state executive officials became the 
standard after Scheuer v. Rhodes.60 Qualified immunity affords 
less protection than absolute immunity in that, while still a com-
plete defense, it is only granted if the official charged can prove 
that he acted reasonably and in good faith under the totality of 
the circumstances as they appeared at the time of the act. The 
official must also prove that he performed the actions in the 
course of his official conduct.61 Absolute immunity, on the other 
hand, protects an official after a showing that he acted within 
the scope of his authority. The Court in Scheuer established a 
standard of qualified immunity to be applied to state executive 
officials. The Court explained: 
[I]n varying scope, a qualified immunity is availa-
ble to officers of the executive branch of govern-
ment, the variation being dependent upon the 
scope of discretion and responsibilities of the of-
fice and all the circumstances as they reasonably 
appeared at the time of the action on which liabil-
ity is sought to be based.8S 
The Bivens/Scheuer line of cases provide a model for deter-
mining the level of immunity to be granted to federal executive 
officials who violate constitutional rights, but no per se rule was 
created. When the question arose in Economou, the Supreme 
Court responded by establishing a standard of qualified immu-
nity for alleged constitutional violations.6s Adopting the same 
rationale as Scheuer, the Court approved qualified immunity as 
the rule rather than the exception, making consistent the level 
of immunity to be applied to both state and federal executive 
officials.64 
59. 456 F.2d 1339, 1341 (2d Cir. 1972). 
60. 416 U.S. 232 (1974). 
61. [d. at 247-48. 
62. [d. at 247. 
63. 438 U.S. 478, 507. The decision did not go unchallenged. Justice Rehnquist ve-
hemently dissented, claiming that the Court's distinction between constitutional viola-
tions and common law torts was of questionable logic. He believed the fundamental issue 
was not that distinction, rather it was the basic policy justifications for official immunity, 
allowing Federal officials to perform their duties with diligence, unhindered. [d. at 519-
21. Justice Rehnquist was joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stewart and Justice 
Stevens. [d. at 517-30. 
64. [d. at 507-08. 
10
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While fixing the standard of official immunity at qualified, 
the Court recognized that such a standard could not be applied 
to all cases. Therefore, an exception was created, relying on a 
functional approach.611 The Economou "special functions" excep-
tion affords absolute immunity to federal officials in certain 
cases where it is "essential for the conduct of public business."66 
The exception grants absolute immunity to certain federal offi-
cials such as judges, prosecutors, and their administrative 
counterparts.67 
One final step was required to establish precedent to apply 
the Economou rule to military officials. This was provided by 
the Eighth Circuit decision of Tigue v. Swaim.68 That court held 
that the military officer's immunity was subject to the same 
qualified immunity standard of Economou, rejecting the argu-
ment that military officials automatically fall within the "special 
functions" exception of Economou.69 Rather, the court looked at 
the particular functions of each officer, his or her immunity at 
common law, and the interests sought to be protected.70 After 
applying this analysis, the Eighth Circuit determined that the 
defendant was indeed performing a special function, and was 
therefore granted absolute immunity.71 Thus, qualified immu-
nity has become the standard for alleged constitutional viola-
tions by federal military officials exercising discretionary 
functions. 
65. Id. at 508-17. 
66. Id. at 507-10. A finding of a "special function" requires an inquiry into the par· 
ticular function of the defendant and the level of immunity historically accorded the 
individual at common law. Id. 
67. Id. at 508-17. 
68. 585 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1978). Tigue, an Air Force captain, sued his superior of· 
ficer for libel and false imprisonment. The action stemmed from plaintiff's removal from 
a program involving access to nuclear weapons. Defendant, the Base Hospital Com· 
mander and Medical Staff Advisor, was responsible for Tigue's evaluation and subse· 
quent exclusion from the program. 
69. Id. at 914. 
70.Id. 
71. Id. at 914-15. For an informative discussion of Economou and its effect on the 
immunity of military officials, see Burgess, Official Immunity and Civil Liability For 
Constitutional Torts Committed by Military Commanders After Butz v. Economou, 89 
MIL. L. REV. 25 (1980). 
11
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C. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
Reviewability 
The Ninth Circuit in Wallace began its analysis with the 
question: which military decisions are reviewable, and which are 
not?72 The court recognized that this issue involves many con-
flicting policy considerations and that any test adopted for de-
termining reviewability must reflect a careful balancing of those 
considerations.78 The primary consideration, the court observed, 
is when constitutional violations are involved. Both the individ-
ual and society as a whole have a deep interest in deterring the 
unconstitutional conduct of a federal official,74 
When the plaintiff is in the military however, there are 
other policy factors to consider. The principal factor which must 
be taken into account is that of military autonomy, or separation 
of powers.711 The basic concern of the courts in the past has been 
that judicial review might usurp the military in the performance 
of its functions. Consequently, the military is an area that the 
courts have traditionally been reluctant to enter.78 
Courts have justified this reluctance on several grounds. 
Civil litigation can be disruptive to military operations.77 Service 
personnel often lack time, money, and means of procuring wit-
nesses.78 Maintaining discipline can be difficult if litigation is 
permitted.79 And finally, as noted by the Supreme Court, 
"judges are not given the task of running the Army. "80 
72. 661 F.2d at 731-32. 
73. 1d. See supra text accompanying notes 14-23. 
74.1d. 
75. 1d. See also Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197, 199 (6th Cir. 1971). 
76. 661 F.2d at 732; Mindes v. Seaman, 463 F.2d at 199; Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 
U.S. 83, 93-94 (1953). 
77. 661 F.2d at 732. See also United State8 v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954) 
(granting relief under the Federal Tort Claims Act to a discharged veteran for negligent 
hospital treatment). 
78. 661 F.2d at 732. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 145 (1950). 
79. 661 F.2d at 732. See, e.g., Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 
U.S. 666, 671-72 (1977) (United States immune from third party indemnity actions for 
damages); United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. at 112; Calhoun v. United States, supra note 
3, at 3. 
80. Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. at 93. See supra text accompanying note 15. But 
see Vance v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 826, 833 (N.D. Texas 1977) ("The desire of the 
judiciary to avoid entanglement in military administration is strong, but no court today 
can avoid reasoned analysis of a serious constitutional claim under the catchphrase that 
12
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Given the conflict of the various policy considerations, the 
Ninth Circuit adopted the Mindes81 approach "when constitu-
tional claims are asserted."82 The Mindes test, the Ninth Circuit 
observed, provides an adequate basis for determining when a 
military decision should be reviewed. It also fairly regards those 
policy considerations militating against review.8s The court de-
clined to rule on whether the Mindes test should also apply to 
nonconstitutional claims however,84 in favor of restricting a po-
tentially overbroad ruling. 
One restriction the court placed on its decision was a quali-
fication upon the nature of the constitutional claim alleged. The 
Ninth Circuit held that only "recognized" constitutional claims 
will receive consideration under its test.811 "Recognized", as used 
by the court, means not only those claims accepted by the courts 
as constitutional, but also claims which amount to more than a 
traditional state law claim.86 The court stressed the importance 
of the qualification because of the need to alleviate the potential 
problem of transforming a simple state tort action into one of 
constitutional dimension through clever pleading.87 The court 
was satisfied that the qualification fairly restricts litigation so 
that only legitimate claims will come to suit. 
Another restriction on litigation is the exhaustion require-
ment. Exhaustion of intraservice remedies, the court observed, 
allows a plaintiff to seek relief without the necessity of civilliti-
gation. If this process proves unavailing, the reviewing court will 
have the benefit of the views and fact-finding of the military au-
judges do not run the army."). 
81. 453 F.2d 197, 201-02. See supra text accompanying notes 29-33. 
82. Wallace, 661 F.2d at 733. 
83. [d. at 734. 
84. [d. at 733 n.5. 
85. See supra note 3. 
86. 661 F.2d at 734. 
87. [d. See, e.g., Everett v. United States, 492 F. Supp. 318, 322 (S.D. Ohio 1980) 
(upholding Feres in a wrongful death action when claims seeking relief "directly under 
the United States Constitution" are in effect actions in tort); Schmid v. Rumsfeld, 481 F. 
Supp. 19, 21 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (denying relief under Feres to military informant for inju-
ries sustained "incident to service"); Misko v. United States, 453 F. Supp. 513, 515 
(D.D.C. 1978) (intramilitary indemnity cannot be avoided by pleading a cause of action 
as arising directly under the fifth amendment when the allegation is already barred by 
the Feres doctrine). See also Calhoun, supra note 3, at 5. 
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thorities.88 Thus, the exhaustion requirement "helps to minimize 
the objections to reviewability based on judicial usurpation of 
military discretion and the need for military expertise."89 
Immunity 
As the Ninth Circuit observed, the question of immunity 
arises only after a finding that the military decision is review-
able, and only if the plaintiff seeks to recover money damages.9o 
Because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the government, 
in suits without its consent, is absolutely immune from liability. 
To circumvent this obstacle, the plaintiff generally will sue the 
officer as an individual, rather than as a representative of the 
United States. A determination must be made by the reviewing 
court of whether the suit is essentially one against the govern-
ment itself and therefore barred by sovereign immunity. 
The Ninth Circuit observed that Economou held federal of-
ficers exercising discretion possess only qualified immunity from 
liability in Bivens-type actions. However, the Economou Court 
also created an exception to the general rule of qualified immu-
nity, recognizing the need for absolute immunity when officials 
engage in "the conduct of public business." Therefore, if the offi-
cial charged was performing a "special function", absolute im-
munity applies.91 
In determining whether a military officer's activities fall 
within the "special function" exception, the court distinguished 
Fe res , where absolute immunity applies to federal officials for 
alleged torts incident to military service. The Wallace court 
found that when the actionable conduct is a constitutional viola-
tion, Feres has no application.92 As the court recognized, both 
the aggrieved individual and society have an interest in deter-
ring unconstitutional conduct. This deterrence, while aided by 
injunctive or declaratory relief, is best effectuated by the possi-
88. 661 F.2d at 734. The court noted that it need not delineate which intraservice 
remedies must be exhausted in all cases since "[tJhe availability and usefulness of a par-
ticular remedy will vary with the branch of the armed forces involved and with the na-
ture of the grievance." [d. at 734 n.6. 
89. [d. at 734. 
90. [d. 
91. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978). 
92. 661 F.2d at 735. 
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bility of personal liability for money damages. When this avenue 
of redress is cut off by absolute immunity, neither the interests 
of the aggrieved party nor society are served. 
The court also observed that counterveiling policy consider-
ations exist which favor absolute immunity. In the military con-
text especially, the policies of separation of powers, military au-
tonomy, the need to maintain discipline and to avoid disruptive 
litigation, militate toward applying absolute immunity. How-
ever, after examining the traditional areas where absolute immu-
nity applies, the court determined that most activities of the 
military "have no precise analogue" to these traditional areas.93 
The court compared the military context to the absolute 
standard long afforded judicial immunity. The adjudication 
function requires insulation from personal liability so that im-
partiality may be preserved, and while this rationale can be eas-
ily analogized to the functions of a military judge, it is inapplica-
ble to a commanding officer whose function it is to give orders 
and duty assignments. Likewise, "judges' insulation from politi-
cal influence, their use of precedent in resolving disputes, and 
the availability of appellate review ... reduce the need for pri-
vate damage actions."9" Again, these rationales do not apply to 
most routine military decisions made during peacetime. 
The court recognized that the difficulty of defending suit 
and the threat to military discipline favor imposing absolute im-
munity. However, the court believed these possibilities should 
not tip the scale in favor of absolute immunity. Moreover, im-
posing absolute immunity in such instances, instead of qualified 
immunity, would only marginally benefit an officer.911 
Because of the conflicting policy considerations peculiar to 
the military context, the court was careful to adopt an interme-
diate course to enable trial courts to weigh these concerns before 
making a determination. The Ninth Circuit recognized that a 
per se rule of absolute immunity could potentially be abused by 
military officials and lead to unredressable wrongs. Conversely, 
too assertive a judicial role could be disruptive to military opera-
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tions, especially in an area where the courts lack expertise. The 
Ninth Circuit chose to adopt a standard of qualified immunity 
while recognizing that the "special functions" exception would 
still afford absolute immunity when appropriate.9s 
D. SIGNIFICANCE 
The Wallace decision is significant for several reasons. Pri-
marily, the decision establishes a test for judicial reviewability of 
internal military decisions. Rather than a per se rule, the test 
articulated by the court approaches the reviewability question 
on the merits of the challenge by considering individual circum-
stances militating either in favor of or against review. The deci-
sion is also notable because it reflects the trend away from abso-
lute immunity for federal officials and toward protection of the 
constitutional rights of military personnel. 
On the issue of reviewability, the Wallace decision sets up a 
framework which allows a trial judge to balance several conflict-
ing policy concerns. No determination can be reached without 
careful consideration of all relevant factors. The restrictions on 
the Wallace rule-limiting review to recognized constitutional 
claims and only after exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies-distill further the candidates for Mindes-type analysis. 
The Mindes test recognizes that occasionally policy consid-
erations exist which favor denial of review, but that such occur-
rences are extreme. In addition, these occurrences can be 
avoided by the use of summary judgment. An absolute rule bar-
ring review "would shield from responsibility even an officer who 
knowingly and in bad faith violates an individual's constitu-
tional rights."97 
As with reviewability, a per se rule of absolute liability pro-
vides too much protection for military officials and comes dan-
gerously close to inviting unconstitutional conduct. Even the 
general standard of qualified immunity in most instances shields 
an officer from liability. The Economou rule does not increase 
the burden on the defendant to the extent that some would ar-
gue. True, the requisite showing to invoke absolute immu-
96. [d. 
97. [d. at 737. 
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nity-acts within the scope of one's authority-is not a high 
standard. But it cannot be said that the qualified immunity re-
quirement is an extraordinarily difficult one to meet. As a result 
of Economou, a defendant official can be protected in two ways: 
either by an adequate showing of performing a special function, 
or the standard of good faith and reasonableness. 
The court also left open the question of whether other cir-
cumstances may arise which favor an exception to the general 
rule of qualified immunity.98 If, for example, the grievance arises 
in a combat setting, future courts are free to create such an ex-
ception. The Ninth Circuit established a case-by-case approach 
which allows an examination of individual concerns. By con-
structing a framework for analysis rather than a per se rule, trial 
courts are better equipped to reach a decision in this often deli-
cate area of law. 
Craig A. Burnett· 
APPEALABILITY OF ORDERS DENYING A MOTION FOR 
APPOINTED COUNSEL IN A TITLE VII SUIT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Bradshaw v. Zoological Society of San Diego, l the Ninth 
Circuit held that an order denying counsel to a plaintiff in a Ti-
tle VIP action is appealable before the final resolution of the 
suit. 
The plaintiff filed suit under Title VII alleging employment 
discrimination based on gender and marital status.8 Title VII 
provides that at the court's discretion, an indigent plaintiff may 
98. [d. at 736. 
• Second year student, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
1. 662 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Reinhardt, J.j the other panel members were 
Skopil, J., and Wallace, J., dissenting). 
2. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976). 
3. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant had denied her application for the position of 
education director at the Zoological Society's Zoo. 662 F .2d at 1303. See also Bradshaw 
v. Zoological Society of San Diego, 569 F.2d 1066, 1067 (9th Cir. 1978). 
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be entitled to appointment of counsel. 4 The plaintiff filed a mo-
tion for appointment of counsel and for leave to proceed in 
forma pauperis. The district court denied the motion for ap-
pointment of counsel, but granted leave to proceed in forma 
pauperis.o The plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the 
order denying appointed counsel; this motion was also denied. 
The plaintiff then requested that the court certify the order for 
interlocutory appeal,6 but the court declined to do so. The plain-
tiff filed a timely notice of appeal under 28 U.S.C. section 1291,' 
the final judgment rule. 
The Ninth Circuit found it had jurisdiction to review an or-
der denying appointed counsel to a Title VII plaintiff before a 
final judgment has been entered. s In so doing, the Ninth Circuit 
is in accord with the majority of circuits that have considered 
the issue.9 However, the Bradshaw opinion is the first to fully 
analyze why an order denying appointed counsel to a Title VII 
plaintiff should be immediately appealable. This decision signifi-
cantly strengthens the position of indigent Title VII plaintiffs 
who, without appointed counsel, might be forced to abandon 
4. The pertinent section provides: "Upon application by the complainant and in 
such circumstances as the court may deem just, the court may appoint an attorney for 
such complainant and may authorize the commencement of the action without the pay-
ment of fees, costs, or security." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)(B) (1976). 
5. 662 F.2d at 1302. This decision was questionable since a motion to proceed in 
forma pauperis and a motion for appointment of counsel share identical determining 
factors: both require a finding of indigency and a finding that the cause of action has 
merit. See 662 F.2d at 1308. 
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976) provides that a district court may cerfify an otherwise 
unappealable order for appellate review. 
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) states in part: "The court of appeals shall have jurisdic-
tion of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States, ... 
except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court." 
8. 662 F.2d at 1320. Although this holding is similar to that reached by several cir-
cuits when considering the appealability of an order denying appointed counsel to a 
plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis (28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1966», the fact that a Title 
VII plaintiff faces predictably complex litigation concerning important legislatively man-
dated rights places the appealability of an order denying counsel to a Title VII plaintiff 
more firmly within the Cohen doctrine. See infra notes 16-24 and accompanying text. 
See also 662 F.2d at 1305 n.11 for a list of § 1915 appealability cases. 
9. For those circuits finding Cohen applicable, see Hudak v. Curators of the Univ. of 
Mi88ouri, 586 F.2d 105 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 985 (1979); 
Caston v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 556 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1977); Spanos v. Penn. Cent . 
. Transp. Co., 470 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1972). Each of these opinions contains only a cursory 
. analysis of the appealability i88ue. See 662 F.2d at 1305 n.11. In Randle v. Victor Weld-
ing Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1981), the court denied appealability, reversing 
its earlier decision in Jones v. WFYR Radio/RKO Gen., 626 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1980). 
18
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meritorious claims. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The Final Judgment Rule and the Cohen Doctrine 
The purposes of the final judgment rule are to restrict the 
appellate caseload, prevent judicial waste, and preserve lower 
court independence.1o The Supreme Court has also seen the rule 
as a barrier to appeals brought to harass opponents.ll Paradoxi-
cally, strict adherence to the final judgment rule can cause judi-
cial waste. Prohibiting immediate review is not economical if an 
early determination of the issue prevents a reversal after final 
judgment and an order for a new trial.12 To correct this problem, 
the courts and legislature have created narrow exceptions to the 
final judgment rule.18 
Apart from the problem of judicial waste, strict compliance 
with the final judgment rule can cause the permanent loss of a 
litigant's rights. The Supreme Court has therefore stated that 
the rule should be given a "practical rather than a technical con-
struction"l4 when review after final judgment would have "a 
final and irreparable effect on the rights of the parties. "UI 
In Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp.,18 the Court set forth 
guidelines for determining from which orders appeals should be 
10. See Note, Appealability of Orders Denying Attorney Disqualification Motions 
in Armstrong v. McAlpin, DET. C.L. REV. 151, 153-61 (1981) for a discussion of the his-
tory and development of these policies. See also Note, Appealability in the Federal 
Courts, 75 HARV. L. REV. 351 (1961). 
11. Congress from the very beginning has, by forbidding piece-
meal disposition on appeal of what for practical purposes is a 
single controversy, set itself against enfeebling judicial admin-
istration. Thereby it avoided the obstruction to just claims 
that would come from permitting the harassment and cost of a 
succession of separate appeals from the various rulings to 
which a litigation may give rise, from its initiation to entry of 
judgment. 
Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1939). 
12. See, e.g., 662 F.2d at 1315. 
13. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1976) which lists appealable interlocutory orders and al-
lows certification of otherwise unappealable orders. 
14. Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1948). 
15. [d. at 545. 
16. 337 U.S. 541 (1948). Cohen allowed the appeal of an order denying a defendant's 
motion to require plaintiff to post security for costs in a shareholder's derivative suit. 
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taken before a final judgment.17 First, the order must be a final 
determination by the lower court. IS This initial inquiry recog-
nizes that the relationship between trial and appellate courts en-
tails review, not supervision. Thus, if a lower court order is ten-
tative, it would be improper interference for the appellate court 
to consider the issue. It 
The second Cohen requirement, separability,20 is also based 
on the importance of lower court independence. To be appeala-
ble, the order must not share issues of law and fact in common 
with the still-unresolved suit in the lower court. A prior determi-
nation of these issues by an appellate court would constitute un-
warranted interference with the lower court proceedings. U 
The third prong of the Cohen test is that the order cannot 
be effectively reviewed after final judgment. lUI Whether effective 
review is possible is measured by the type and degree of harm to 
be suffered by the person seeking early review.23 Cohen empha-
sized that some rights are more "important" than others, and 
thus should not be denied immediate review.24 A more recent 
Supreme Court case, Firestone Tire & Rubber v. Risjord,26 re-
quires a showing of concrete, irreparable harm which could be 
avoided only by immediate appeal.2S This requirement operates 
to check appeals brought to purposely delay trials or harass op-
ponents by giving the court discretion as to the relative impor-
tance of the appeal.27 
Although the relativism of the Cohen doctrine leaves room 
for judicial discretion, language such as "too important to be de-
17. [d. at 546. 
18. [d. 
19. "Permitting piecemeal appeals would undermine the independence of the dis-
trict judge .... " Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981). 
20. 337 U.S. at 546-47. 
21. 449 U.S. at 374. 
22. 337 U.S. at 546. 
23. 449 U.S. at 376; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331 n.ll (1975). 
24. 337 U.S. at 546. 
25. 449 U.S. 368 (1981). 
26. [d. at 376. 
27. 662 F.2d 1301, 1315. "Civil rights litigants simply do not appeal an order deny-
ing them appointed counsel in order to obstruct 'just claims,' but rather do so in an 
attempt to vindicate their rights." [d. 
20
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nied review"28 makes the doctrine difficult to apply to a general 
class of orders. The language of Cohen gives rise to questions of 
equity more easily answered by the facts of each individual case. 
In Roberts v. United States District Court,29 the Supreme Court 
held that a denial of leave to proceed in forma pauperis is im-
mediately appealable under Cohen. The Court did not further 
analyze the issue. so In Firestone, the Court held that a denial of 
an attorney disqualification motion is not appealable under Co-
hen because no irreparable harm would be caused by review 
after final judgment.sl The propriety of the lower court's deci-
sion to refuse disqualification of counsel would be "difficult to 
assess until its impact on the underlying litigation may be evalu-
ated, which is normally only after final judgment. "S2 
As the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Bradshaw demonstrates, a 
motion for appointment of counsel under Title VII is more 
closely related to a motion to proceed in forma pauperis than it 
is to a request for disqualification of counseps One who is de-
nied appointed counsel in a Title VII suit is unlikely to be able 
to proceed with the complex litigation,s4 much as the plaintiff 
denied permission to proceed in forma pauperis is stopped from 
pursuing his or her claim. The litigant denied a motion for dis-
qualification of counsel, however, may still participate in the 
suit, even while watching for signs of prejudice. This distinction 
applies as well to the question of effective review after final 
judgment. The plaintiff requesting leave to proceed in forma 
pauperis or to have counsel appointed may be forced to aban-
don the claim before final judgment if either motion is denied. SII 
This would naturally preclude appeal after final judgment and 
the plaintiff's claim would be lost without having had the chance 
for appellate review. By contrast, the litigant denied a motion to 
disqualify an attorney is usually capable of continuing the suit 
and making an appeal. 
In the unlikely event that a Title VII plaintiff had the 
28. 337 U.S. at 546. 
29. 339 U.S. 844 (1949). 
30. The Court did not offer any reasons to support its holding. Id. at 844-45. 
31. 449 U.S. at 378. 
32. Id. at 377. 
33. 662 F.2d at 1308-10. 
34. Id. at 1310. 
35. Id. at 1312. 
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means to litigate the claim through final judgment and appeal, it 
is doubtful that the harm suffered in the first trial could be rem-
edied by a new trial with appointed counsel. 88 If the uncounseled 
plaintiff is considered to have had the opportunity to cross-ex-
amine witnesses, for example, the testimony given at the first 
trial may be admitted as evidence in the new trial and the plain-
tiff would be bound by any errors made in obtaining that testi-
mony.87 As the Bradshaw court points out, an un counseled liti-
gant would probably be unaware of making prejudicial errors 
and would be unable to prove that errors had been made.88 
Some of the issues raised by delays of criminal trials are 
also applicable to the instant question. The Ninth Circuit esti-
mated that if appeal of the appointment of counsel question 
were delayed until after the final judgment and the appeal re-
sulted in a new trial, the claim brought by the plaintiff might 
not be resolved until seventeen years after it arose.89 When years 
of delay are involved, evidence can be lost, memories may dim, 
witnesses may be influenced and the entire cultural context of 
the suit may have changed.40 
The Nature of Title VII Rights 
The resolution of the question presented in Bradshaw 
turned upon the nature of the rights created by Title VII since 
Cohen and its progeny require that immediate appeal be allowed 
only for "important" rights that would be irreparably lost if ap-
peal were delayed.41 
Title VII was enacted to create a legal remedy for victims of 
discrimination in employment. Congress recognized that admin-
istrative agencies alone could not remedy employment discrimi-
nation: "[T]he private right of action ... provides the aggrieved 
party a means by which he may be able to escape from the ad-
36. Id. at 1312-14. 
37. 4 H. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 804-19 (1981). 
38. 662 F.2d at 1313-14. 
39. Id. at 1314 n.25. 
40. See generally Brief for Appellant, United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850 
(1978). This last factor may have an especially significant effect on the outcome of a civil 
rights suit, since, for example, a jury may have viewed racial discrimination as a more 
important problem in 1968 when the issue received much public attention, than it would 
have a decade later when such attention diminished. 
41. 662 F.2d at 1306. 
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ministrative quagmire .... ""2 However, the drafters feared 
that since a Title VII plaintiff would most likely belong to a dis-
advantaged class, "the maintenance of a suit may impose a great 
burden on a poor individual complainant.""s Therefore, provi-
sion was made for counsel to be appointed at the discretion of 
the district court."" Since Title VII does not provide guidelines 
for appointment of counsel,411 the courts have conditioned ap-
pointment upon a finding that the plaintiff is indigent, has made 
reasonable efforts to retain counsel, and is presenting a meritori-
ous claim. "8 
C. THE Bradshaw DECISION 
The Majority 
In Bradshaw, the Ninth Circuit held that an order denying 
appointed counsel to a Title VII plaintiff meets the criteria for 
appealability under Cohen. 47 To be appealable, "the order must 
conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an impor-
tant issue completely separate from the merits of the action and 
be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.""s 
The majority found that the order denying appointed coun-
sel was a final decision of the district court. "8 The first prong of 
the Cohen test was satisfied as the district court judge had de-
nied a motion to reconsider the order and there was no indica-
tion in the record that the order was tentative.60 
The Ninth Circuit found that the issue of appointment of 
42. 110 CONGo REC. 12,721 (1964), reprinted in E.E.O.C. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
TITLES VII AND XI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 3004 (1968). 
43. [d. 
44. 42 U.S.C. 2000e·5(0(1)(B) (1976). See supra note 4. 
45. There is some indication that the section containing the provision for appointed 
counsel was hastily included in Title VII. See 118 CONGo REC. 954 (1972) which describes 
the removal from the bill of a cease and desist authority. The provision for appointed 
counsel was inadvertently weakened by the removal and was quickly amended by a voice 
vote. This may explain why the drafters did not foresee certain problems in the statute's 
application. If, for example, a Title VII plaintiff loses the suit, appointed counsel may 
receive no compensation. As pointed out by the Bradshaw dissent, the drafters could 
have also made a provision for appealability. 662 F.2d at 1322. 
46. See, e.g., Caston V. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 556 F.2d at 1305, 1309 (5th Cir. 1977). 
47. 662 F.2d at 1306. 
48. Coopers & Lybrand V. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978). 
49. 662 F.2d at 1306. 
50.Id. 
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counsel is separate from the merits of the Title VII suit, thus 
satisfying the second Cohen requirement. III Since the purpose of 
the separability requirement is to protect the independent de-
terminations of the lower court, the Ninth Circuit looked at the 
extent to which appellate courts would become "enmeshed" in 
issues of law and fact as yet undetermined by the lower court. liS 
The test used by the courts to determine if counsel should 
be appointed is the same as that used to consider a motion to 
proceed in forma pauperis: a finding of plaintiff's indigency and 
a finding that the underlying claim has merit.1I3 The Supreme 
Court has held that the denial of a motion to proceed in forma 
pauperis is appealable before final judgment under Cohen. II .. 
Since the determination is the same for both motions, the Ninth 
Circuit found that the separability requirement was met in 
Bradshaw. 1I1I This finding was further supported by an earlier 
Ninth Circuit decision holding that an order denying appoint-
ment of counsel to revervation Indians was appealable under 
Cohen. lie 
The third requirement of the Cohen doctrine is that review 
51. Id. at 1310. 
52. Id. at 1307. 
53. Id. at 1308. 
54. Roberts v. United States District Court, supra note 29. 
55. 662 F.2d at 1308. The court also suggested that the determination of merit could 
be made from a favorable Equal Employment Opportunity Commission "reasonable 
cause" finding. Before filing suit under Title VII, the plaintiff must submit the facts 
surrounding the alleged discrimination to the EEOC. If the EEOC finds reasonable cause 
to believe the complaint has merit, the plaintiff is so notified. The procedure is designed 
to assure federal jurisdiction for the suit. Id. at 1309. 
The court then suggested that a favorable EEOC determination may be used by an 
appeals court when deciding an appointment of counsel issue. An unfavorable EEOC 
statement, on the other hand, should not be used because if erroneous, the plaintiff's 
rights may be abridged. Use of the EEOC determination is not necessary since the court 
may use the same limited investigation required for a motion to proceed in forma 
pauperis when determining appointment of counsel. Id. at n.20. See also Caston, supra 
note 9, at 1309~ 
56. Id. at 1310, citing Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. Escondido Mutual Water 
Co., 459 F.2d 1082 (9th Cir. 1972). See also Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266 (9th 
Cir. 1981). In Ivey, the Ninth Circuit considered the appeal of an order denying ap-
pointed counsel to a Title VII plaintiff. In determining that the plaintiff's Title VII claim 
was not meritorious, the court looked at the plaintiff's criminal record. The plaintiff had 
been convicted of twenty-six felony counts for acts done in the course of his employ-
ment; the Ninth Circuit held that the suit based on racial discrimination in firing the 
plaintiff lacked merit. The order denying appointed counsel was affirmed. Id. at 269. 
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of the order after final judgment would be ineffective.67 The 
Bradshaw court distinguished between the effectiveness of a new 
trial as the remedy for erroneous denial ofa motion to appoint 
counsel and the remedy for an order denying disqualification of 
counseP8 In Firestone, the Supreme Court had found that upon 
reversal of a denial of disqualification of counsel, a new trial 
would sufficiently remedy the harm suffered by the appellant in 
the' first trial. II9 The Ninth Circuit distinguished Firestone on 
two grounds: the likelihood of resulting injury and the homoge-
neous nature of Title VII appointment of counsel claims.80 
The Supreme Court denied interlocutory appeal in Fire-
stone because the appellant had not shown a "single concrete 
example" of prejudice which would result from appeal after final 
judgment.8J Because an order denying disqualification of counsel 
does not always cause harm to the appellant, specific examples 
of harm must be shown.82 The Bradshaw court pointed out that 
the likelihood of injury to one denied appointed counsel was 
great and that prejudice was inherent in proceeding to trial 
without counsel. 88 
The second reason appealability was not found in Firestone 
was that the question of disqualification of counsel arises in di-
verse legal contexts; since the amount and degree of harm can 
not be predicted for this type of order, allowing early appeal 
would be less efficient than waiting until final judgment to assess 
the harm done.84 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the same is 
not true of orders denying appointed counsel to a Title VII 
plaintiff. Since Title VII litigation is so complex, an uncounseled 
plaintiff with a meritorious suit would predictably lose the right 
to proceed with the claim or be bound by prejudicial errors 
made at the first trial.86 Therefore, it is not necessary for the 
Title VII plaintiff to show that actual harm was suffered in or-
der to appeal an order denying appointed counsel; the Cohen 
57. 662 F.2d at 1310. 
58. [d. at 1312-13. 
59. 449 U.S. 368, 378 (1981). 
60. 662 F.2d at 1312-13. 
61. 449 U.S. at 376. 
62. [d. 
63. 662 F.2d at 1312. 
64. 449 U.S. at 377-78. 
65. 662 F.2d at 1313. 
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requirement is satisfied by a presumption of irreparable harm.66 
The Bradshaw court found its holding to be supported by 
the policies underlying both the final judgment rule and Title 
VII. Allowing the early appeal of an order denying appointed 
counsel to a Title VII plaintiff would not result in interference 
with the lower court's determinations if the order was final.67 It 
is unlikely that a plaintiff would seek to delay trial by making 
the appeal, since without counsel the suit may never be resolved. 
Judicial waste would actually be avoided by allowing the appeal, 
since reversible error could be avoided during the first trial, or a 
plaintiff who was properly denied counsel may be encouraged to 
abandon the suit at an early stage.66 The court found it unlikely 
that an appropriate refusal of appointed counsel would result in 
the case following "the normal course to trial. "69 
The Ninth Circuit found that allowing early appeal of the 
order was also supported by the congressional intent underlying 
Title VII.70 Since the provision for appointed counsel was char-
acterized by Congress as an "important" right, the presumption 
that a Title VII plaintiff could not effectively litigate a claim 
without counsel was warranted.71 
The Dissent 
The dissent based its opinion on the view that the Cohen 
doctrine is extremely narrow and should not be invoked for the 
sole reason of avoiding injustice.7lI Rejecting the presumption 
reached by the majority that uncounseled Title VII litigation is 
ineffective, the dissent concluded that Congress must have an-
ticipated some plaintiffs proceeding in propria persona. Con-
66. Id. at 1313-14. 
67. Id. at 1314. 
68. Id. at 1315-16. 
69. Id. at 1316. 
70. Id. at 1316-17. 
71. Id. at 1317. The Bradshaw court, finding that it had jurisdiction of the appeal 
under Cohen, then turned to the merits of the appeal. The appellate court found that 
the lower court order granting the plaintiff permission to proceed in forma pauperis was 
sufficient to support a finding of indigency. The second requirement, that the plaintiff 
use reasonable efforts to obtain counsel, was satisfied by affidavits filed with the court. 
To satisfy the requirement of meritoriousness, the Ninth Circuit used the favorable 
EEOC determination obtained by the plaintiff prior to the suit. The order denying ap-
pointed counsel was reversed and the case remanded to district court. Id. at 1319-20. 
72. Id. at 1320-21. 
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gress could have provided for interlocutory appeal within Title 
VII, but did not.73 
Although agreeing that the finality requirement of Cohen 
was satisfied in Bradshaw, the dissent argued that an order de-
nying appointed counsel could not be considered apart from the 
Title VII cause of action.7• The determination necessary for ap-
pointment of counsel requires a deeper investigation into the 
facts comprising the plaintiff's cause of action than would a de-
cision concerning leave to proceed in forma pauperis since coun-
sel should not be appointed to a losing case.711 Since Title VII 
does not provide for an attorney's compensation in the event the 
case is lost, the dissent reasoned that the hardship to counsel 
must be balanced against the benefit to the plaintiff. This would 
entail more than a finding that the suit was "non-frivolous."76 
The dissent found that an order denying appointed counsel 
could be effectively reviewed after final judgment." Two lines of 
cases illustrate the difference between a right that would be de-
stroyed without immediate appeal and an erroneous order which 
would merely "taint" the first trial'8 The dissent concluded that 
an erroneous order denying appointed counsel would only taint 
the proceedings as does the non-appealable denial of a motion to 
disqualify an attorney.79 Denial of appointed counsel does not 
destroy a right as would wrongful denial of bail to a criminal 
defendant. 80 
The Bradshaw plaintiff would not suffer loss of rights, the 
73. Id. at 1321. 
74. Id. at 1321-22. 
75. Id. at 1322. 
76. Id. The dissent also disagreed with the majority's suggestion that an EEOC rea-
sonable cause determination could be used to decide if the plaintiff's case had merit. The 
dissent believed that an EEOC statement can only be used for jurisdictional purposes. 
The dissent also objected to the disparate treatment given favorable and unfavorable 
EEOC findings. Id. at 1322-23. The basis for this objection is unclear since only the 
plaintiff's rights would be at stake and no one else would be affected by the use of only 
favorable findings. 
77. Id. at 1323. 
78. Id. at 1323-24. Compare Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) (rights in danger of 
harm because bail was denied), with Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 
368 (1981) (rights are not endangered by an appeal after final judgment of an order 
denying disqualification of counsel). 
79. 662 F.2d at 1324. 
SO.Id. 
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dissent explained, since she could continue with her suit, ob- . 
taining a new trial after final judgment if the denial of counsel 
was erroneous.81 An order denying appointed counsel is distin-
guishable on this point from an order denying leave to proceed 
in forma pauperis since denial of the latter prevents the plain-
tiff from proceeding at all. ~he dissent saw no "inherent 
prejudice" in prosecuting a Title VII claim without benefit of 
counsel since the plaintiff is as likely to win the suit as she 
would be likely to commit prejudicial tactical errors.82 Since the 
outcome of the suit is speculative, the Cohen doctrine should be 
inapplicable. Some concrete irreparable harm must be shown 
before an early appeal should be allowed. The dissent also rec-
ommended use of a writ of mandamus as an appropriate avenue 
for relief.88 
Last, the dissent argued that allowing interlocutory appeal 
of orders denying appointed counsel would not serve the goal of 
judicial economy.84 The final judgment rule requires that all ap-
peals from a suit be heard at once so that only one retrial may 
be necessary. Interlocutory appeals result in delay of the pro-
ceedings in the lower courts.811 Since the losing side always has 
an interest in appealing orders, allowing interlocutory appeal 
only serves the interests of that side. The dissent feared that the 
ability to delay trial with early appeals would result in forcing 
the settlement of strike suits.88 
D. SIGNIFICANCE 
While the Bradshaw decision is in accord with the majority 
of circuits that have considered the issue,8? it is the first to con-
sider the issue after Firestone. It is also the first to have thor-
oughly analyzed the appealability of an order denying appointed 
counsel to a Title VII plaintiff. 
81. Id. 
82.ld. 
83. Id. But see Roberts, supra note 29, which rejected the use of mandamus to ap-
peal a denial to proceed in forma pauperis. 
84. 662 F.2d at 1325. 
85.ld. 
86. Id. at 1320. Since the dissent found that the Ninth Circuit should not have juris-
diction to hear the Bradshaw appeal, the opinion did not contain discussion of the mer-
its of that appeal. 
87. See supra note 9. 
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Three basic questions divided the Bradshaw court. First, 
the dissent disagreed that an appellate court could decide the 
appointment of counsel issue without interfering with the lower 
court's independent findings of law and fact.88 Since the case law 
requires only that the court find that the plaintiff's case has 
merit and does not define merit in terms of who will win or lose 
the suit, the dissent's objection is unfounded. It is unfortunate 
that Title VII contains no provision for compensation of ap-
pointed counsel when the plaintiff loses the case, but this is an 
issue beyond the scope of appealability. The actual basis for the 
disagreement between the majority and the dissent in Bradshaw 
is the question of whether an uncounseled plaintiff can effec-
tively litigate a Title VII suit. If refusal to appoint an attorney 
effectively prevents continuance of the suit, a judge considering 
the probable outcome of the suit as a basis for appointing coun-
selis actually determining the plaintiff's right to sue. Congress 
provided the victim of employment discrimination with the right 
to sue; this is not a matter for the court's discretion. 
Without statistical data, it may be impossible to determine 
if an uncounseled plaintiff can effectively litigate a Title VII 
suit. The dissent pointed out that the plaintiff in Bradshqw had 
thus far been able to pursue her claim in court,8S but the dissent 
neglected to note that the plaintiff had been receiving assistance 
from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in her ef-
fort to receive appointed counsel. eo The EEOC does not have 
sufficient resources to assist every needy Title VII plaintiff.sl Ti-
tle VII is a complex piece of legislation and the litigation arising 
from it is much more complicated than the type of suit a layper-
son can successfully pursue without counsel. The majority's pre-
sumption that an uncounseled plaintiff may be forced to aban-
don a Title VII cause of action is a reasonable one. The courts, 
therefore, should look to the merit of the plaintiff's claim to de-
termine if counsel should be appointed since basing a decision 
on the eventual outcome of the suit could result in an unjust 
88. 662 F.2d at 1321-22. 
89. Id. at 1322 n.4. 
90. Id. at 1311 n.24. 
91. The EEOC's burdensome caseload has led to "lengthy delays in the administra-
tive process and has frequently frustrated the remedial role of the agency." H.R. REP. 
No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d SeBS. (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 
2137, 2147. 
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deprivation of the plaintiff's right to sue. 
The second point of contention within the Bradshaw court 
concerned the availability of effective review after final judg., 
ment. Once again, the basis of the disagreement is the plaintiff's 
ability to successfully litigate a Title VII claim without benefit 
of counsel. The majority held that an un counseled plaintiff 
would suffer irreparable harm if forced to proceed through the 
first trial without opportunity to appeal the denial of appoint-
ment of counsel,92 There are several types of errors to which the 
plaintiff would be bound in the event of a new trial. The dissent 
refused to assume that an uncounseled plaintiff would make 
prejudicial errors and would require a showing of actual harm 
before allowing an appeal,93 The problem with this position is 
that the only wayan uncounseled plaintiff could show that prej-
udicial errors had been committed would be to proceed through 
the lower court trial. However, by the time actual errors could 
be shown, the irreparable harm that the Cohen doctrine is 
designed to prevent would already have occurred. The plaintiff 
should not be put in such an anomalous position. If the pre-
sumption that an uncounseled plaintiff cannot effectively pursue 
a Title VII suit is reasonable, then an early appeal of the ap-
pointment of counsel issue is the only means to prevent irrepa-
rable harm to the plaintiff. 
The third area of divergence between the Bradshaw major-
ity and dissent was over the effect of the court's holding on judi-
cial economy. The dissent feared that an exception to the final 
judgment rule would create uneconomical delays in the lower 
courts and increase the number of appeals.B• The majority 
stated that an early appeal of the appointment of counsel issue 
would prevent the need for reversal and grant of a new trial. B6 
Again, this disagreement is based upon the uncounseled plain-
tiff's ability to pursue effective Title VII litigation. If an uncoun-
seled plaintiff is unable to pursue a Title VII claim, it is likely 
that refusal to appoint counsel will be reversible error. If revers-
ible error is more likely than not, then judicial economy is better 
served by an early appeal and avoidance of retrial. This question 
92. 662 F.2d at 1312. 
93. Id. at 1324. 
94. Id. at 1325. 
95. Id. at 1315-16. 
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should be resolved on the side of allowing interlocutory appeal, 
since the courts' duty to protect legislatively created rights must 
outweigh concern for burgeoning caseloads.96 
Although the Ninth Circuit has expressed a reluctance to 
enlarge the class of appealable orders,9? the Bradshaw opinion 
shows that the court recognizes a need to provide effective re-
view of orders wholly dependent on the trial judge's discretion. 
Since the appointment of counsel depends upon the court's dis-
cretion, it would be unlikely that a lower court judge would rec-
ognize the possibility of abuse of that discretion by certifying 
the order as appealable. In addition, appellate courts should give 
particular attention to those rights dependent wholly on judicial 
discretion to insure that effective review of decisions affecting 
those rights is available. 
By expressly recognizing that an uncounseled Title VII 
plaintiff cannot effectively litigate a civil rights suit,98 the Ninth 
Circuit has helped to secure the only remedy afforded by Title 
VII. It is to be hoped that the district courts will be less hesitant 
to appoint counsel for an indigent plaintiff presenting a merito-
rious Title VII claim. 
Susan Shors· 
96. See Cohen, 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1948). See also Note, Appealability of Orders 
Denying Attorney Disqualification Motions in Armstrong v. McAlpin, DET. C.L. REv. 
151, 165 (1981), discussing the harm done to the entire judicial system when litigants' 
rights are subordinated to the desire to "maintain moderate work loads." 
97. See Cord v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1964) in which the court stated 
that the certified appeal allowed by 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976) removed any incentive to 
enlarge the class of appealable orders. 
98. 662 F.2d at 1312, 1314. 
• Second year student, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
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DIVERGENT APPLICATION OF COHEN DOCTRINE TO 
GRANT OF MOTIONS DISQUALIFYING COUNSEL IN 
CRIMINAL AND CIVIL CASES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In United States u. Greger/ the Ninth Circuit held that a 
district court order disqualifying a criminal defendant's counsel 
is not appealable prior to a final judgment under 28 U.S.C. sec-
tion 1291.1 The district court had disqualified the defendant's 
counsel from further representation in the case because of a con-
flict of interest.8 The defendant sought an immediate appeal of 
the ruling or, alternatively, that the court treat the request for 
review as a petition for a writ of mandamus. The court refused 
to issue the writ because the applicable guidelines were not 
met.· 
In the case In Re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings (Petro-
leum Products),r' the Ninth Circuit held that an order disquali-
fying counsel in a civil case is immediately appealable under sec-
tion 1291. Petroleum Products was a consolidated multi-district 
antitrust case in which defense counsel was disqualified from 
representing defendant's former and present employees in con-
nection with discovery dispositions. By allowing both the defen-
dants and the deponents to appeal the decision, the court ex-
tended the right to an immediate appeal to any party involved 
in a civil suit whose counsel has been disqualified. 
1. 657 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Duniway, J.; the other panel members were 
Norris, J. and Hanson D.J., sitting by designation), petition for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 
3607 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1982)(No. 81-1357). 
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) provides: "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of 
appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States, ... except 
where direct review may be had in the Supreme Court." 
3. Defendant's counsel and his firm had represented witnesses before the grand jury 
in connection with the same investigation which led to defendant's indictment, 657 F.2d 
at 1114. 
4. A writ of mandamus is provided for by Title 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1976), which 
states: "The Supreme Court and all courts established by an act of Congress may iBBue 
all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to 
the usages and principles of law." The Supreme Court in Kerr v. United States, 426 U.S. 
394 (1976) explained that the remedy of a writ of mandamus is a drastic one and should 
be employed only in extraordinary circumstances. 
5. 658 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Goodwin, J.; the other penal members were 
Nelson, J. and Price, D.J., sitting by designation), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1615 (1982). 
The Ninth Circuit, in Gough v. Perkowski, 694 F.2d 1140 (9th Cir. 1982), affirmed its 
decision in Petroleum Products. 
32
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 12
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol13/iss1/12
1983] FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 281 
The appellants in both cases sought appellate jurisdiction 
under Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp. 6 As a result of the two 
Ninth Circuit decisions, Cohen is applicable to attorney disqual~ 
ifications in civil suits but not in criminal prosecutions. This 
casenote will analyze this distinction and explore appellate juris~ 
diction under Cohen in the two different legal contexts.7 
B. BACKGROUND 
The Cohen Doctrine 
Appellate jurisdiction in the federal courts is based on Title 
28 U.S.C. section 1291.8 This statute codified the common law 
"final judgment rule" which mandates that appellate review of 
lower court rulings await the termination of the litigation in the 
trial court.9 
In the landmark case of Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp.,10 
the Supreme Court acknowledged that there are some interlocu~ 
tory decisions which Congress intended to be appealable within 
the meaning of section 1291. The Court defined these decisions 
as a "small class which finally determine claims of right separa-
ble from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too im-
portant to be denied review and too independent of the cause 
6. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The issue presented in Cohen was whether defendants in a 
stockholders derivative action had the right to require that plaintiffs post security for 
costs. 
7. The Ninth Circuit has become increasingly sensitive to the proliferation of inter-
locutory appeals. In Greger the jurisdictional issue was argued only after the court solic-
ited supplemental briefs on the issue. In a previous case which dealt with the same issue 
as that presented by Petroleum Products, the court overlooked the jurisdictional issue. 
Gas·A-Tron of Arizona v. Union Oil Co. of California, 534 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976). 
8. See supra note 2. 
9. In Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 (1935), the Court explained the rea-
sons for the final judgment rule in these terms: 
Id. at 324. 
Finality as a condition of review is an historic characteristic of 
federal appellate procedure. It was written into the first judici-
ary act and has been departed from only when observance of 
it would practically defeat the right to any review at all. Since 
the right to a judgment from more than one court is a matter 
of grace and not a necessary ingredient of justice, Congress 
from the very beginning has, by forbidding piecemeal disposi. 
tion on appeal of what for practical purposes is a single con-
troversy, set itself against enfeebling judicial administration. 
10. 337 U.S. at 541. 
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itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until 
the whole case is adjudicated."l1 The Court also emphasized 
that the statute should be given a "practical rather than a tech-
nical construction."12 
Cohen's Application in the Criminal Context 
The first application of the Cohen doctrine by the Supreme 
Court in the criminal context was in Stack v. Boyle,ls where the 
Court found that the denial of a defendant's motion to reduce 
bail can be immediately appealed. More recently, in Abney v. 
United States,14 the Supreme Court held that a motion to dis-
miss an indictment on the ground that it violates the prohibition 
against double jeopardy is also immediately appealable under 
Cohen. In finding the Cohen rationale applicable, the Abney 
Court reasoned that the constitutional protection against double 
jeopardy would be irretrievably lost if the defendant must un-
dergo a trial for the same offense twice before litigating his claim 
on appeal. 1& Despite its holding, the Court nevertheless empha-
sized that the Cohen doctrine would have less applicability in 
criminal prosecutions than in civil suits. Ie 
Cases subsequent to Abney demonstrate the limited extent 
to which the Supreme Court is willing to extend the Cohen doc-
trine in criminal cases. In United States v. MacDonald/'1 the 
Court held that a denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment on 
the ground that a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been 
violated is not an appealable order under Cohen. In distinguish-
ing the speedy trial claim from the double jeopardy claim in Ab-
ney, the Court insisted that the right to a speedy trial is not a 
"right not to be tried" but rather a right to be free from convic-
11. rd. at 546. 
12. rd. 
13. 342 U.S. 1 (1951). Writing separately in Stack, Justice Jackson, the author of 
Cohen, explained that "an order fixing bail can be reviewed without halting the main 
trial-its issues are entirely independent of the issues to be tried-and unless it can be 
reviewed before sentence, it can never be reviewed at all." rd. at 12. 
14. 431 U.S. 651 (1977). 
15. rd. at 661. 
16. "Adherence to this rule of finality has been particularly stringent in criminal 
prosecutions because 'the delays and disruptions attendant upon intermediate appeal,' 
which the rule is designed to avoid 'are specially inimical to the effective and fair admin-
istration of the criminal law.' .. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. at 657, quoting Dibella 
v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 124 (1962). 
17. 435 U.S. 850 (1978). 
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tion if the right is violated.18 The defendant can seek a dismissal 
of the conviction on appeal if he proves his speedy trial claim. 
Interlocutory review under Cohen is therefore unnecessary to 
safeguard the right. 
In United States v. Layton, the Ninth Circuit examined the 
application of the Cohen doctrine in criminal cases, reasoning 
that "a challenge to the 'very authority of the prosecution to hail 
the defendant into the court in the first place' has been the basis 
of each of the claims in the criminal context which have been 
held by the Supreme Court or this court to be immediately ap-
pealable under Cohen. "19 Thus, the Layton court held that the 
denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion is not appealable before a final judgment.2o In United 
States v. Garner,21 the Ninth Circuit found that an order deny-
ing a motion to dismiss based on grand jury irregularities is also 
not an immediately appealable order. Just as MacDonald re-
jected the claim that the right to a speedy trial would be irrepa-
rably lost if reviewed only after conviction, the Ninth Circuit 
found that the right to a grand jury indictment before trial 
would not be defeated if claims of grand jury irregularities were 
not subject to immediate review.22 
The Ninth Circuit, however, has been willing to extend its 
reasoning in Layton beyond the limits set forth by the Supreme 
Court. In United States v. Wilson,23 denials of motions to dis-
miss on the ground of selective prosecution were held to be im-
mediately appealable. Likewise in United States v. Yellow 
Freight System,24 the court found that a refusal to dismiss pros-
ecution for lack of an indictment is appealable under the Cohen 
18. [d. at 861. One of the underlying reasons of the speedy trial clause is the preven-
tion of prejudice to the defense due to the passage of time. The Court reasoned that an 
assessment of possible prejudice could not be made until the evidence was presented at 
trial. Thus. the Court concluded the order was not totally collateral to the merits. 
preventing the application of Cohen. [d. at 859. 
19. 645 F.2d 681. 683 (9th Cir. 1981). quoting United States v. Griffin. 617 F.2d 
1342. 1346 (9th Cir.). cert. denied. 449 U.S. 863 (1980). 
20. 645 F.2d at 684. 
21. 632 F.2d 758. 766 (9th Cir. 1980). 
22. [d. at 765. 
23. 639 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1981). For an analysis of the Wilson case. see Note. Selec-
tive Prosecution of Tax Protestors: Did the Ninth Circuit Go Too Far. 12 GOLDEN GATE 
UNIV. L. REV. 325 (1981). 
24. 637 F.2d 1248. 1251 (9th Cir.). cert. denied. 454 U.S. 815 (1981). 
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doctrine. 
In its most recent opinion dealing with this issue in a crimi-
nal context, United States v. Hollywood Motor Car CO.,SI the 
Supreme Court held Cohen inapplicable to a denial of a motion 
to dismiss an indictment due to vindictive prosecution. Relying 
on MacDonald, the Court reasoned that the right to be free 
from vindictive prosecution could be safeguarded on appeal by a 
dismissal of the convictions on the disputed charges. S8 
Cohen in the Civil Context 
The scope of Cohen's applicability in the civil context has 
not been as clearly defined as it has been in the criminal con-
text. In criminal cases the applicability of Cohen is dependent 
upon whether the order implicates a right which would be lost 
irretrievably if appeal was deferred until after conviction and 
sentencing. This right is not at issue in a civil suit. Thus the 
Supreme Court, in Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp.,n ad-
vocated a practical approach to the question of finality in civil 
cases. The Court stated: 
Our cases long have recognized that whether a 
ruling is 'final' within the meaning of § 1291 is 
frequently so close a question that decision of 
that issue either way can be supported with 
equally forceful arguments, and that it is impossi-
ble to devise a formula to resolve all marginal 
cases coming within what might well be called the 
'twilight zone' of finality. IS 
As a result of this difficulty, the Court has urged that the re-
quirement of finality be given a "practical rather than a techni-
cal construction."se In giving it a practical construction, the 
Court has urged a balancing between "the inconvenience and 
25. 102 S. Ct. 3081 (1982). 
26. Id. at 3085. Hollywood overturned the Ninth Circuit decision in United States v. 
Griffin, 617 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 863 (1980). The Griffin court 
reasoned that a claim of vindictive prosecution raised a right to be free from the prosecu-
tion itself, and thus would be lost irreparably if Cohen did not apply. Id. at 1345. 
27. 379 U.S. 148 (1964). 
28. Id. at 152. In Gillespie, the petitioner sued for damages under various theories 
on behalf of several beneficiaries. The district court struck portions of the complaint 
relating to one of the plaintiff's theories of liability as well as parts relating to recovery 
for persons other than the plaintiff. Id. at 156. 
29. 337 U.S. 541, 546. See supra note 12. 
36
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 12
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol13/iss1/12
1983] FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 285 
costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger of 
denying justice by delay on the other."30 
This kind of balancing was demonstrated in Norman v. Mc-
Kee,31 where the Ninth Circuit held that Cohen was applicable 
to a district court's disapproval of a class action settlement 
under Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.32 The 
court reasoned that because of the inherent length and complex-
ity of class action suits, the inconvenience of piecemeal review of 
an order disapproving a settlement is outweighed by the danger 
of denying justice to each member of the represented class.33 
In an effort to clarify the scope of the Cohen doctrine, the 
Supreme Court, in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,3. listed three 
requirements an order must meet to be immediately appealable 
under Cohen. The order must: (1) conclusively determine the 
disputed question; (2) resolve an important issue completely 
separable from the merits of the action; and, (3) be effectively 
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.311 
In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord,38 the Court's 
most recent decision dealing with Cohen in a civil context, an 
30. 379 U.S. at 152-53, quoting Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 
507, 511 (1950). The Gillespie Court reasoned that in this case any delay in reviewing 
the rights of persons referred to by the stricken portions of the complaint would be so 
unjust as to outweigh the inconvenience and cost of piecemeal review. 379 U.S. at 153. 
31. 431 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1970). 
32. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) states: "A class action shall not be dismissed or compro-
mised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compro-
mise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs." 
33. 431 F.2d at 474. 
34. 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978). 
35. The Court ruled that the Cohen doctrine does not apply to a prejudgment order 
denying class certification because such an order is subject to revision in the district 
court under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(I); involves considerations that are "enmeshed in the 
factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff's cause of action," (quoting Mercantile 
National Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 558 (1963»; and is subject to effective review 
after final judgment at the behest of the named plaintiffs or intervening class members. 
See also United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977). 
36. 449 U.S. 368 (1981). In Firestone, defendant liability insurer moved to disqualify 
lead counsel for the plaintiff because of an alleged conflict of interest arising from the 
fact that defendant was also an occasional client of the lead counsel's law firm. Defen-
dant argued that this association between plaintiff's lead counsel and defendant's insurer 
would give him an incentive to structure plaintiff's claims for relief so as to enable the 
insured to avoid liability, thus increasing defendant's own potential liability. Id.at 370-
71. 
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order denying a motion to disqualify opposing party's counsel 
was adjudged not immediately appealable. The Court relied on 
the three-prong test established in Coopers and reasoned that 
the third-prong-requiring the order to be effectively unreview-
able on appeal-was not satisfied. S7 The possibility of a new trial 
is wholly adequate to remedy an erroneous refusal to disqualify 
counsel,88 However, the Court expressly left open the question of 
whether its reasoning would extend to orders granting disqualifi-
cation of counsel. S9 
United States v. Greger is the first circuit decision to ad-
dress the issue of appealability of a grant of counsel disqualifica-
tion in a criminal case. Those cases which have addressed this 
issue . in a civil context have found the Cohen doctrine to be 
applicable. 
In Armstrong v. McAlpin,·o the Second Circuit upheld ap-
pealability, reasoning that a disqualification order is effectively 
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment because gaining 
reversal of the lower court's judgment would subject the party to 
the difficult if not insurmountable task of proving the case was 
lost because he was improperly forced to change counsel. U The 
District of Columbia Circuit in Community Broadcasting of 
Boston, Inc. v. FCC reached the same result by comparing the 
difference between orders granting disqualification and those de-
nying disqualification to orders granting and orders denying 
summary judgment.411 "[W]hile the affirmative grant of the re-
quested relief is final and appealable, a mere refusal to act is 
necessarily less conclusive and ought not to be reviewed by this 
court."·s 
37. Id. at 376. 
3S. Id. at 37S. The Court reasoned that the potential harm that might be caused by 
an erroneous denial of a disqualification motion would not differ significantly from the 
harm caused by erroneous denials of other nonappealable interlocutory orders such as 
those denyirig discovery or for recusal of the trial judge. Id. 
39. Id. at 372 n.S. 
40. 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980). 
41. Id. at 440-41. 
42. 546 F.2d 1022, 1025, 1025 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
43. Id. at 1025 n.13, quoting Fleischer v. Phillips, 264 F.2d 515, 517 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 359 U.S. 1002 (1959), rev'd per curiam, Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. 
Chrysler Motors Corp., 496 F.2d SOO (2d Cir. 1974). 
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C. THE Greger DECISION 
In holding Cohen inapplicable to motions denying disquali-
fication of defense counsel," the Greger panel was significantly 
influenced by the Supreme Court's opinion in Firestone. Adopt-
ing the reasoning of Firestone, the court did not distinguish be-
tween the civil context presented in Firestone and the criminal 
context in Greger. Rather, the court noted that historically the 
Cohen doctrine has been applied more sparingly in the criminal 
context.·11 
In addition, the Greger panel reasoned that the difference 
between a denial of a motion to disqualify counsel and a grant of 
such a motion is not of decisive significance. The court asserted 
that the disruption of the litigation from an order disqualifying 
counsel-which creates a sense of finality in a civil case-is ab-
sent in a criminal case where the court can appoint substitute 
counseL·' Furthermore, like the order refusing to disqualify 
counsel, an order granting such a motion in a criminal case is 
effectively reviewable on appeal from a final judgment because 
on appeal, prejudicial error is presumed if the order is shown to 
have been erroneous.·7 A new trial would then be ordered, 
thereby vindicating the defendant's right to counsel. The court 
contrasted this remedy with the right against double jeopardy 
which would be irretrievably lost if not vindicated before trial.·8 
In acknowledging that the remedy subjects the defendant to 
a second trial, the court pointed out that the individual injustice 
of enduring a second trial is outweighed by the considerations 
44. The court specifically noted that it was not considering whether orders disquali-
fying government counsel are appealable. However, the court pointed out that "Ii]n such 
a case, were the defendant to be found innocent, the government, because of the rule 
against double jeopardy, would not be able to seek re-trial on the basis that the disquali-
fication order was erroneous." Greger, 657 F.2d 1109, 1113 n.l. 
45. 657 F.2d at 1112. 
46. [d. at 1113. The court reasoned that the very fact that Greger was a criminal 
case made it analogous to Firestone even though Greger involved a grant of a disqualifi-
cation motion and Firestone a denial. The effect of a disqualification order in a criminal 
case, the court reasoned, is minimized by the appointment of substitute counsel thus 
likening it to the effect of a denial of a disqualification motion in a civil case. [d. 
47. [d. See Slappy v. Morris, 649 F.2d 718, 723 n.4 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 
U.S.L.W. 3783 (U.S. Mar. 30, 1982) (No. 81-1095). But see United States v. Curcio, 694 
F.2d 14, 19-20 (2d Cir. 1982); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1332 (9th Cir. 1978) 
(en bane), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979). 
48. 657 F.2d at 1113. 
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underlying the final judgment rule. If appealability were recog-
nized on this basis, "a whole host of orders made in the course of 
a criminal trial would be immediately appealable."49 
In declining to issue a writ of mandamus ordering the dis-
trict court to reinstate the disqualified attorney, the Greger 
court noted that as in orders denying motions to disqualify 
counsel, "the most prudent course is to find such orders unap-
pealable but to retain discretion to permit exceptional cases to 
be heard before final judgment by means of a petition for writ of 
mandamus."lIo In deciding whether such a writ should issue, the 
court examined the guidelines set forth by the Ninth Circuit in 
Bauman v. United States,lI! and held that they had not been 
met by the defendant. III 
D. THE Petroleum Products DECISION 
In Petroleum Products, the Ninth Circuit found the three 
elements comprising a "collateral order" under Firestone to be 
present. IS The court noted that the first element-requiring the 
order to be conclusive as to the disputed question-is stronger 
in the case of a grant of disqualification than in a denial." Un-
like a denial, an order granting disqualification is not subject to 
reconsideration. 
Second, the order was a decision on a legal issue that was 
completely separate from the merits of the antitrust issues being 
litigated in the case. 1111 The order was based on certain canons of 
ethics regarding when an attorney must be disqualified.lIs No an-
49.ld. 
50. ld. at 1114. 
51. 557 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1977). The five guidelines outlined in Bauman are: (1) the 
party seeking the writ has no other adequate means of relief, such as direct appeal; (2) 
the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way not correctable on appeal; (3) the 
district court's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law; (4) the district court's order 
is an oft-repeated error or manifests a persistent disregard of the federal rules; and (5) 
the district court's order raises new and important problems or issues of first impression. 
In cases where some guidelines suggest one conclusion and other guidelines suggest an-
other, the court should balance the competing considerations. ld. at 654-55. 
52. 657 F.2d at 1115. 
53. See supra text accompanying note 35. A "collateral order" is synonymous with 
an interlocutory order under the Cohen doctrine. 
54. 658 F.2d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1981). 
55.ld. 
56. Canon 9 of the A.B.A. Code of Professional Responsibility empowers the district 
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titrust issues were implicated in the decision. 
Finally the court found that the order was effectively unre-
viewable on appeal from a final judgment. Within this context 
the court found that without immediate review, a party would 
suffer a loss of rights which a new trial could not adequately 
remedy. To illustrate this point, the court contrasted Greger, 
noting that the presumption of prejudice from an erroneous dis-
qualification order in a criminal case does not exist in a civil 
case. An appellant in a civil case would thus have the difficult 
burden of showing that the case was lost because of the forced 
change of counsel in the course of the litigation.1I7 In addition, 
the court noted that in a civil case, the imposition on the rights 
of the aggrieved party by the disruption of the litigation would 
not be cured as in a criminal case by the appointment of substi-
tute counsel. Finally, the court noted that the special policies 
which dictate the need for speed and uninterrupted prosecutions 
in a criminal case do not carry as much force in a civil suit. lIB 
E. ANALYSIS 
Greger is the first criminal case in which any circuit court 
has confronted the disqualification of counsel issue since the 
MacDonald and Firestone decisions. The Supreme Court's rea-
soning in those cases strongly emphasized the policy against 
piecemeal review. Influenced by this posture, the Ninth Circuit 
in Greger refrained from creating another exception to the final 
judgment rule. 
The rule that a criminal defendant cannot immediately ap-
peal an order disqualifying his counsel is entirely consistent with 
Ninth Circuit precedent in the application of Cohen in criminal 
cases.1I9 These cases establish that the only interlocutory deci-
court to disqualify attorneys if their conduct interferes with the integrity of the court or 
actually produces the appearance of impropriety. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILITY Canon 9 (1979). 
57. 658 F.2d at 1358. 
58. [d. 
59. See United States v. Layton, 645 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1981) (claim of lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction not immediately appealable); United States v. Wilson, 639 F.2d 
500 (9th Cir. 1981) (selective prosecution claim immediately appealable); United States 
v. Garner, 632 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1980) (claim of grand jury irregularities not immedi-
ately appealable); United States v. Griffin, 617 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 
U.S. 863 (1980). 
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sions in a criminal prosecution considered final prior to a final 
judgment are those which adjudicate the defendant's right to be 
free from prosecution itself.60 Unless awaiting final judgment im-
plicates this right, the policy of expeditiously determining the 
defendant's guilt or innocence militates against interlocutory re-
view of district court orders. 
The Greger panel chose not to address the broader issue of 
whether a criminal defendant has a right to continuous repre-
sentation of counsel throughout his trial.61 If the court had so 
concluded, immediate appellate review would arguably be re-
quired to preserve this right. However, such a decision may have 
opened the door for allowing interlocutory appeals of any court 
order which affects a defendant's right to counsel. In addition, 
the Ninth Circuit has expressed the concern that the Cohen ex-
ception not be allowed to swallow up the final judgment rule and 
abrogate the intent of Congress as expressed in section 1291.6t 
As Petroleum Products points out, an order disqualifying 
counsel in a civil suit operates in a vastly different context than 
in a criminal prosecution. As a result, the reasoning expressed by 
courts in dealing with the Cohen doctrine in criminal cases is 
not always relevant to the civil context. Most importantly, the 
right to be free from prosecution is inapplicable in a civil case. 
Also absent from consideration in civil cases is the special need 
in criminal trials for rapid administration of justice. 
While both areas of the law strive for the uninterrupted ad-
ministration of justice, within the civil context, courts have en-
gaged in a balancing process to determine whether allowing in-
terlocutory review would impede or further this goal. For 
example, in Armstrong v. McAlpin68 the Second Circuit prohib-
60. Whether an order impacts on such a right is not always self-evident. For exam-
ple, in United States v. Griffin, 617 F.2d 1342, 1345 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 863 
(1980), the Ninth Circuit held that an order denying a defendant's motion to dismi88 
because of vindictive prosecution did not encompass the right to be free from prosecu-
tion itself. However, in United States v. Hollwyood Motor Car Co., 102 S. Ct. 3081 
(1982), the Supreme Court disagreed. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. 
61. The Supreme Court appears ready to decide this issue in Slappy v. Morris, 649 
F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3783 (U.S. Mar. 30, 1982)(No. 81-
1095). 
62. United States v. Garner, 632 F.2d 759, 765 (9th Cir. 1980). 
63. 625 F.2d 433, 437 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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ited interlocutory appeal of orders denying the disqualification 
of counsel because it found that the motions were often used as 
a device for delaying trial. The Fifth Circuit in Duncan u. Mer-
rill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,e.t. held that orders dis-
qualifying counsel are immediately appealable, noting that when 
such motions are granted, the litigation is disrupted by the time 
and effort required by a party to secure new counsel and famil-
iarize him with the case. 
The Petroleum Products panel nevertheless felt compelled 
to deal with the apparent contradictory holding of Greger. In 
determining that the Cohen doctrine applies, the court distin-
guished Greger on three grounds. First, in the civil context an 
order disqualifying counsel is not effectively reviewable on ap-
peal from a final judgment.611 The same is not true in criminal 
cases: a presumption of prejudice exists because an erroneous 
disqualification of a defendant's counsel implicates the sixth 
amendment right to counsel. 66 A civil litigant faces the almost 
insurmountable burden of proving the case was lost because he 
was improperly forced to switch counsel, while a criminal defen-
dant need only convince a reviewing court that the order was 
improper to win reversal, thus obviating the need for immediate 
appellate review. 
The second difference is the degree of finality the order has 
in the civil versus the criminal context. The court in Petroleum 
Products argued that in a criminal case, the disruptive effect of 
a disqualification order is strongly mitigated by the appointment 
of substitute counsel if the defendant should not be able to af-
ford new counsel. However, this position understates the value 
of the attorney-client relationship in criminal cases by implying 
that a criminal defendant's relationship with his particular at-
torney is of less significance than his civil counterpart. 
Finally, Petroleum Products noted that public policy mili-
tiates against interlocutory review in criminal cases. However, 
the necessity of a retrial each time a conviction is reversed is 
arguably inconsistent with the policy of efficiency and expedi-
ency in the criminal justice system. The Fifth Circuit in United 
64. 646 F.2d 1020, 1027 (5th Cir. 1981). 
65. 658 F.2d at 1358. 
66. 649 F.2d at 723 n.4. 
43
Burnett et al.: Federal Practice & Procedure
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1983
292 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:279 
States v. Garcia,87 allowed a defendant to appeal his attorney's 
disqualification in order to avoid the waste of scarce resources 
and duplication of a retrial. In United States v. Hobson,88 the 
Eleventh Circuit took a novel approach by allowing an interlocu-
tory appeal of a disqualification order, but refusing to stay the 
trial court proceedings pending appeal. In this manner, the bur-
den of a new trial is avoided if the order is deemed erroneous, 
and the prosecution in the lower court is not stalled during the 
appeal. 
F. SIGNIFICANCE 
The Greger decision helps define the <;ontours of a criminal 
defendant's right to counsel. The decision implies that the right 
to counsel does not encompass the right to a trial free from in-
terference with the attorney-client relationship. 
The Petroleum Products decision may have several ramifi-
cations. First, trial judges conscious of court congestion may now 
be less willing to grant a motion to disqualify a party's counsel 
knowing that denial of the motion cannot be appealed. Instead, 
a judge may take the approach of issuing protective orders to 
prevent the same taint that a disqualification order is aimed at 
eliminating.89 A second possible effect may be to refine the stan-
dards for when motions disqualifying counsel should be granted. 
The issue may become a legal rather than a discretionary ques-
tion for the trial judge. Trial court judges will thus have to ad-
here to the developing legal standards as appeals from the or-
ders are taken.70 Finally, the court's holding emphasizes the 
Ninth Circuit's practical approach to the Cohen doctrine in civil 
cases and confirms the narrow treatment this doctrine will re-
67. 517 F.2d 272, 275 (5th Cir. 1975). 
68. 672 F.2d 825, 826 (11th Cir. 1982). 
69. See Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d at 438·39. 
70. In Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1976), the court 
noted that while disq\lalification orden are issued within the lower court's discretion, 
courts have recently expressed "serious reservations" about whether the scope of appel. 
late review is limited to finding an abuse of discretion where only a purely legal question 
is at issue. The court then decided to examine the applicable ethical principles in decid· 
ing the validity of the disqualification in the case. Id. at 810. Cf. In Re Gopmon, 531 F.2d 
262, 266 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that an order disqualifying counsel could be reversed 
only upon a showing of abuse of discretion). 
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ceive in the criminal context. 
Richard B. Shikman* 
OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE 
A. QUESTIONING THE BASIS OF THE Feres DOCTRINE 
In Monaco u. United States,l Broudy u. United States," and 
Lewis u. United States,S the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Feres 
doctrine4 which bars government liability under the Federal 
Tort Claims Acta (FTCA) "for injuries to servicemen where the 
injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to 
service. "8 
In Monaco, the Ninth Circuit held that the claimant and his 
daughter could not recover under the FTCA for injuries arising 
from claimant's in-service exposure to radiation even though the 
injuries did not manifest themselves until after claimant left the 
service. 
During World War II, the claimant was stationed at the 
University of Chicago where, as part of a special program, he 
was required to perform calisthenic exercises in the football 
field. He alleged that while involved in this program, experi-
ments in atomic reactions were being conducted in a laboratory 
beneath the stadium in connection with the "Manhattan Pro-
• Second year student, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
1. 661 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Nelson, J.; the other panel members were 
Canby, J. and Battin, D.J., sitting by designation) (rehearing denied, Dec. 14, 1981), cert. 
denied, 102 S. Ct. 2269 (1982). 
2. 661 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Nelson, J.; the other panel members were Skopil 
and Norris, JJ.) (as amended, Dec. 21, 1981). 
3. 663 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Hug, J.; the other panel members were Schroe-
der and Nelson, JJ.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2959 (1982). 
4. The Feres doctrine was established in Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
5. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346(b) & (c), 1402(b), 1504, 2110, 2401(b), 2402, 2411(b), 
2412(c), 2671-2680 (1976 & Supp. 1981). 
6. 340 U.S. at 146. 
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ject", which developed the first atomic weapon. 
The claimant was not apprised of his exposure to radiation 
until 1971, when he was informed that he had cancer of the co-
lon induced by radiation. At the same time, he learned that the 
radiation had induced a genetic change which caused his daugh-
ter to be born with a birth defect resulting in brain hem-
morhages, aphasia and other permanent injuries. 
The claimant and his daughter brought a consolidated ac-
tion under the FTCA, which waives traditional sovereign immu-
nity and exposes the government to liability arising from per-
sonal injury or property damage caused by the negligence of any 
government employee "acting within the scope of his office or 
employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a 
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance 
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred."7 
The claimant and his daughter alleged that the Army was negli-
gent in permitting his exposure to radiation. 
In Feres v. United States, the Supreme Court established 
an exception to the FTCA's waiver of immunity "for injuries to 
servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of 
activity incident to service."s In Stencel Aero Engineering Corp . 
. v. United States,9 the Supreme Court extended the Feres excep-
tion to bar a third party's indemnity claim for damages paid to 
cover service-related injuries. The Supreme Court has noted 
three reasons for the military exception. First, the Court has ex-
pressed a concern with the effects of such suits on military disci-
pline, and "the extreme results that might obtain if suits . . . 
were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent acts in the 
course of military duty."1O Second, the FTCA's reliance on the 
law of the place where the negligent act occurred would lead to 
inconsistent application of the law.l1 Finally, military personnel 
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976). 
8. 340 U.S. 135, 146. 
9. 431 U.S. 666 (1977). 
10. United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 100, 112 (1954). The Monaco court referred to 
this concern as "the most convincing explanation for the continued vitality of the Feres 
doctrine." 661 F.2d at 132. 
11. In Feres, the Supreme Court stated that recovery by military personnel would 
be "dependent upon geographical considerations over which they have no control and to 
laws which fluctuate in existence and value." 340 U.S. 135, 143. The Court concluded 
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can recover under the Veterans' Benefit Act,n which provides 
"no fault" compensation as a substitute for tort liability and 
limits the extent of governmental liability for service-related 
injuries. 13 
The claimant in Monaco relied on United States u. 
Brown,14 arguing that since his cancer manifested itself after he 
left the service, his injury did not arise out of activity incident to 
service. lei The court rejected this argument by distinguishing 
Brown, since in that case the negligent act itself occurred post-
service. The court found that the proper test is not when the 
injury occurred, but rather when the negligent act itself took 
place. Since claimant's injury resulted directly from in-service 
exposure to radiation, the court concluded that the govern-
ment's negligence occurred while claimant was in the service, 
even though the injury did not manifest itself until after 
discharge.16 
The claimant's daughter advanced two arguments. First, she 
claimed that her injury was not the result of an in-service injury 
because the genetic change in her father that caused her birth 
defects was no injury. The court reiterated that "the proper fo-
cus in applying the Feres doctrine is not the time of injury, but 
the time of the negligent act."17 The court reasoned that it was 
immaterial whether the daughter's injury occurred when she was 
born with the birth defect or when her father suffered genetic 
change; the allegedly negligent act took place while her father 
was in the service. 
Next, the daughter argued that recovery should not be 
barred because she was never a member of the armed forces and 
her claim has no effect on military discipline. The court noted 
that the Supreme Court had rejected both aspects of this argu-
ment in Stencel. There, the Court concluded that "the effect of 
the action upon military discipline is identical whether suit is 
that this would "hardly be a rational plan." Id. 
12. 38 U.S.C. §§ 301-1008 (1979 & Supp. 1981). 
13. 661 F.2d 129, 131. 
14. 348 U.S. 100 (1954). In Brown, recovery was allowed to include post-service neg-
ligent treatment of an in-service injury. 
15. 661 F.2d 129, 132-33. 
16. Id. at 133. 
17.Id. 
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brought by the soldier directly or by a third party."IS The Ninth 
Circuit also rejected the daughter's argument that non-military 
claimants should be entitled to recover because of their inability 
to collect compensation under the Veterans' Benefit Act. In the 
court's view, the fact that the daughter sought relief for an in-
jury to herself rather than indemnity for losses due to in-service 
injury to her father did "not change the substantive analysis."19 
In Broudy v. United States, the Ninth Circuit concluded 
that the government's failure to warn of, monitor and treat any 
possible injuries arising from exposure to radiation might consti-
tute an independent, post-service negligent act if the govern-
ment learned of the danger after discharge. In 1957, while plain-
tiff's husband served as an officer in the Marine Corps, he was 
ordered to participate in military exercises in the vicinity of two 
nuclear tests conducted in Nevada. For several years after his 
discharge in 1960, plaintiff's husband was treated for various 
health problems at Marine medical facilities, but was not in-
formed of or warned about the dangers associated with his expo-
sure. In 1976, plaintiff's husband was diagnosed as having a form 
of cancer that has been related to low-level radiation exposure. 
One year later, he died from that disease.2o 
The court found that plaintiff was barred by Feres and its 
progeny from bringing a claim for an in-service tort continuing 
after discharge. However, the court stated that the government's 
failure to warn plaintiff's husband of and monitor any possible 
injuries arising from his exposure might constitute an indepen-
dent, post-service negligent act under Brown if the government 
learned of the danger after plaintiff's husband left the service.21 
18. 431 U.S. 666, 673. 
19. 661 F.2d 129, 134. 
20. 661 F.2d 125, 126. 
21. 661 F.2d at 128-29. See Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 
1979) (finding independent tort and granting recovery where government deliberately 
refused to give claimant information on drug experiments performed on him in-service); 
Schwartz v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 536 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (allowing recovery for fail-
ure to warn, where dangerous effects of drug administered during service not discovered 
until post-service). But see Stanley v. CIA, 639 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1981) (alleged failure 
.0 monitor effects of chemical warfare an in-service tort, the effects of which simply re-
mained uncorrected following discharge); Henning v. United States, 446 F.2d 774 (3d 
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972) (recovery denied for failure to inform 
claimant of in-service misdiagnosis of tuberculosis); In re "Agent Orange" Product Lia-
bility Litigation, 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (recovery denied where government 
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In remanding the case to the district court, the Ninth Circuit 
noted that plaintiff's allegations concerning the government's 
knowledge were "somewhat confused" and acknowledged that 
this confusion may have resulted from an inability to gain the 
necessary information from the government.22 
In Lewis v. United States, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
policies supporting the Feres doctrine require that courts also 
bar intentional tort claims asserted against the government by 
military personnel. The widow of a Marine Corps lieutenant 
colonel brought a wrongful death action against the government 
after her husband died in a plane crash. She alleged that the 
acts or omissions of government employees in maintaining, oper-
ating and controlling the aircraft amounted to "sabotage."23 
The Ninth Circuit declined to pass on the claim which 
would require it to focus on the actions of the government in the 
military context. The court noted that the Feres language indi-
cated "no limitation" as to the types of injuries involved and 
that the "critical determination" is the status of the plaintiff not 
the status or actions of the tortfeasor.24 
The Feres doctrine has been sharply criticized. The Monaco 
court commented that "the basis for the exception has recently 
become the subject of some confusion" and noted that several 
cases in the Ninth Circuit have held the military exception ap-
plicable "even where there was no command relationship be-
tween the claimant and the tortfeasor."26 The Monaco panel was 
particularly reluctant to apply the doctrine in the daughter's 
case. The court stated that "[i]n her case, the price of avoiding 
examination of events long past, and involving her behavior in 
no respect, appears to be [a] complete denial of recovery."26 
failed to warn military personnel about effects of chemical agent because there was no 
separate and distinct act of post-discharge negligence). 
22. 661 F.2d at 129. At one point in her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the 
government learned of the dangers "subsequent to 1955 and prior to 1972"-a span that 
covered the time period prior to Major Broudy's discharge in 1960. At other points, how-
ever, she alleged specifically that the government knew of the harmful effects of radia-
tion prior to her husband's exposure. 1d. 
23. 663 F.2d 889, 890. 
24. 1d. at 891. 
25. 661 F.2d at 132. See Troglia v. United States, 602 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1979); 
United States v. Lee, 400 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1053 (1969). 
26. 661 F.2d at 134. 
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The argument for barring the daugher's claim in Monaco is 
attenuated. It is difficult to imagine how military discipline 
would be jeopardized if claims such as that brought by the 
daughter were allowed. Her claim was far removed from the 
command relationship and her harm was belated and unfore-
seen. Nonetheless, the court felt bound by the "developed doc-
trine" and its broad prohibition of judicial examination of mili-
tary activities, even where a third party brings a claim in his or 
her own interest.27 
One commentator considers the Feres doctrine "unneces-
sary" and believes "[i]t deprives military personnel of redress 
for harms in the name of policies that are more than adequately 
fulfilled by the FTCA's 'discretionary function' exception."28 
The discretionary function exception protects government 
"planning" activities as opposed to those which are merely "op-
erational".29 In Feres, a serviceman was killed when the barrack 
in which he was sleeping burned down. Government negligence 
was alleged in the maintenance of the heating system. Had the 
Court decided the case under the "discretionary function" ex-
27. Id. See Van Sickel v. United States, 285 F.2d 87, 90 (9th Cir. 1960) (denying 
recovery for wrongful death action found to be "original and distinct cause of action 
granted to the heirs and personal representatives of the decedent to recover damages 
sustained by them."); In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 506 F. Supp. 
762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (denying recovery to children claiming genetic injuries and birth 
defects caused by parents' exposure to Agent Orange); Harrison v. United States, 479 F. 
Supp. 529, 532-35 (D. Conn. 1979), aff'd without opinion, 622 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(wife's action for loss of consortium barred even though her action was "for damages to 
her own interest, not a remote consequence of the tortfeasor's injury to the husband."). 
28. See Note, From Feres to Stencel: Should Military Personnel Have Access to 
FTCA Recovery? 77 MICH. L. REV. 1099 (1979). 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976) provides express 
exceptions to the application of the FTCA. The "discretionary function" exception 
includes: 
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of 
the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a 
statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation 
be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the fail-
ure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on 
the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Govern-
ment, whether or not the discretion involved be abused. 
Id. at § 2680(a). 
29. The distinction between "planning" activities as opposed to "operational" activ-
ities originated in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953). In Dalehite, the Su-
preme Court barred a claim for damages arising from the explosion of a shipload of 
fertilizer manufactured in connection with a War Department project for the export of 
fertilizer to devastated countries following World War II, because the alleged negligence 
took place "at a planning rather than operational level." Id. at 42. 
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ception, it might have found that the maintenance of the bar-
rack's heating system was a purely operational activity and not a 
matter of military judgment. Instead, the Feres Court dismissed 
the claim as a service-related injury,SO thereby denying recovery 
to the claimant and establishing a broad-based military 
exception. 
The discretionary function exception shields the govern-
ment from liability for activities which are a matter of military 
judgment. The exception would more than adequately guard 
against the possibility that an elimination of the Feres doctrine 
would open a floodgate of litigation against the military. It is 
doubtful whether those claims presented in Monaco and Broudy 
could survive the "discretionary function" exception. The gov-
ernment could argue with probable success that the Monaco 
claimant's injury resulted from a governmental project in the 
planning phase. The government could buttress its argument by 
relying on such factors as the need for, and time restrictions on, 
the research and development of the atomic bomb. In Broudy, 
the government has an even stronger case under the discretion-
ary function exception. The exception would protect decisions to 
employ potentially dangerous training methods or to experiment 
with the effects of certain weaponry on combat troops, since 
these policy decisions in the military context fall squarely within 
the "discretionary function" exception. 
The military could argue another statutory exception to the 
FTC A which involves intentional tort claims brought against the 
government.S! In Lewis, the government argued that the plaintiff 
stated a claim under one of the intentional tort theories ex-
cluded by the FTC A since the acts or omissions on the part of 
government employees were characterized as "sabotage". How-
ever, the court found no need to address this issue because of 
the Feres doctrine. 
With the Feres doctrine left intact, the law prevents mili-
tary personnel and their family members from bringing suits 
against the government if the injuries or fatalities are service-
30. 340 U.S. 135, 146. 
31. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976 & Supp. 1981). The FTCA also excludes claims arising 
in foreign countries, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1976), and from combatant activities, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2680(g) (1976). 
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related. Recovery may be allowed if the plaintiff can allege and 
show an independent, post-service negligent act. Injuries arising 
from exposure to radiation might constitute such an act if the 
government learned of the danger after discharge. Otherwise, 
the only other channels of redress available are certain limited 
legislative remedies.32 The court in Monaco encouraged claim-
ant's daughter to pursue any legislative remedies and expressed 
the hope that if Congress is made aware of the seriousness of 
such claims, it will be moved to grant relief, or to change the law 
to allow such recoveries.33 
B. PARROTING THE REQUIREMENTS OF FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 36 MAY BE CONSIDERED AN ADMISSION 
In Asea v. Southern Pacific Transportation CO.,3. the Ninth 
Circuit held that a response which fails to admit or deny a 
proper request for admission does not comply with requirements 
of federal procedural rules if the answering party does not make 
a "reasonable inquiry,"3G or if information "readily attainable"36 
is sufficient to enable him to admit or deny the matter. The 
court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
not requiring the answering party to make an amended 
response.37 
In Asea, plaintiff sued the defendant for damages and 
served the defendant with a series of requests for admissions 
pursuant to rule 36(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.38 
32. Prior to the enactment of the FTCA, the only recourse for a citizen injured by 
the negligence of a government employee was to petition Congress to pass a private bill 
providing a special grant of relief. Feres, 340 U.S. at 139-40. 
Id. 
33. 661 F.2d at 134 n.3. In a footnote concluding its opinion, the court stated: 
Perhaps if Congress is made aware of the seriousness of claims 
such as [claimant's daughter] Denise's it will be moved to 
grant relief to the individuals who request it, or to change the 
FTCA to allow such recoveries in the federal courts. We sin-
cerely hope Congress will do at least the former. 
34. 669 F.2d 1242 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Wallace, J.; the other panel members were 
Wright, J. and East, D.J., sitting by designation) (rehearing and rehearing en banc de-
nied, Mar. 8, 1982). 
35. 669 F.2d at 1245. 
36.Id. 
37. Id. at 1247. 
38. FED. R. CIV. P. 36(a) (Supp. 1982) provides in part: 
A party may serve upon any other party a written request for 
the admission, for purposes of the pending action only, of the 
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As to the principal factual issues, the defendant responded as 
follows: "Answering party cannot admit or deny. Said party has 
made reasonable inquiry. Information known or readily available 
to this date is not complete. Investigation continues."s9 
After plaintiff deposed more of defendant's employees, it 
became convinced that defendant had in fact known the cause of 
the damage claim for many months, and therefore could have 
admitted or denied the requests for admissions.40 On a motion to 
have these requests ordered admitted, the defendant claimed 
that its responses were proper under rule 36(a) because it did 
not have first hand information. In spite of this claim, the dis-
trict court granted the motion in favor of plaintiff. 
On appeal, the defendant argued that its responses satisfied 
rule 36(a), and, in the alternative, that the proper sanction for 
the failure to make a reasonable inquiry prior to answering a 
request for admission lies in an award of the expenses incurred 
in proving the fact at trial, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 37(c).41 
truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) set forth 
in the request that relate to statements or opinions of fact or 
of the application of law to fact, including the genuineness of 
any documents described in the request . . .. 
The matter is admitted unless ... the party to whom the re-
quest is directed serves upon the party requesting the admis-
sion a written answer or objection addressed to the matter ... 
. The answer shall specifically deny the matter or set forth in 
detail the reasons why the answering party cannot truthfully 
admit or deny the matter .... An answering party may not 
give lack of information or knowledge as a reason for failure to 
admit or deny unless he states that he has made reasonable 
inquiry and that the information known or readily obtainable 
by him is insufficient to enable him to admit or deny .... 
The party who has requested the admiBBioDB may move to 
determine the sufficiency of the answers or objections. . . . If 
the court determines that an answer does not comply with the 
requirements of this rule, it may order either that the matter 
is admitted or that an amended answer be served. 
39. 669 F.2d at 1244. 
40. Id. at 1244-45. 
41. Id. at 1245. In pertinent part, Rule 37(c) provides: 
If a party fails to admit the. . . truth of any matter requested 
under rule 36, and if the party requesting the admissions 
thereafter proves the. . . truth of the matter, he may apply to 
the court for an order requiring the other party to pay him the 
reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including 
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The Ninth Circuit found that "[t]he purpose of Rule 36(a) 
is to expedite trial by establishing certain material facts as true 
and thus narrowing the range of issues for trial. "42 A party may 
not refuse to admit or deny when the information to the request 
is readily available to him because a reasonable burden may be 
imposed on the parties to facilitate trial. "The appropriate pen-
alty for a party's failure to discharge that burden, however, IS 
unclear. "48 
The court noted three circumstances under which a request 
for admission may be deemed admitted if the answer does not 
comply with the requirements of the rule: (1) failure to answer 
or object to a proper request for admission; (2) an evasive denial 
which does not specifically deny the matter;44 and (3) a response 
which does not set forth in detail the reasons why the answering 
party cannot truthfully admit or deny the matter.411 
Rule 36(a) states that if a party has insufficient information 
to admit or deny the matter and that party has made a reasona-
ble inquiry, it must so state.46 The defendant argued that its an-
reasonable attorney's fees. . . . 
42. 669 F.2d at 1245. See also Keen v. Detroit Diesel Allison, 569 F.2d 547, 554 
(10th Cir. 1978); Webb v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 81 F.R.D. 431, 436 (E.D. Pa. 
1978). 
43. 669 F.2d at 1245. 
44. [d. See also United States v. Kenealy, 646 F.2d 699 (1st Cir. 1981). In Kenealy, 
the defendants appealed from the granting of a summary judgment supported by "mat-
ters involuntarily admitted against them, pursuant to Rule 36." [d. at 702. The court 
stated: 
They do not-as they cannot-dispute that deeming matters 
admitted is a proper remedy under appropriate circumstances 
for intransigence during discovery. Rule 36 requires specificity, 
detailed explanation when a truthful answer cannot be 
framed, good faith, and fairness. Given appellants' opaque, . 
generalized, and tardy denials, their failure to oppose the gov-
ernment's request for this relief, and their incredibly cavalier 
conduct in this litigation, we decline to tamper with the dis-
trict court's action, which was well within its discretion. 
[d. at 702-03. 
45. [d. at 1245. See Havenfield Corp. v. H & R Block, Inc., 67 F.R.D. 93 (W.D. Mo. 
1973). "One cannot answer properly in the alternative but 'must comply strictly and 
literally with the the terms of the statute upon peril of having [one's] response construed 
to be in legal effect an admission' "). [d. at 97 (citation omitted). The court held that the 
remedy for the answering party's failure to respond adequately was to order that party 
to answer properly the day following the issuance of the order or to have those requests 
for admissions deemed admitted. [d. 
46. See supra note 38. 
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swer was sufficient because it was literally in compliance with 
the rule.47 But the rule also requires that the answering party 
make a reasonable inquiry into knowledge and information read-
ily obtainable by him.4S Again, the appropriate sanction for fail-
ure to take such steps is not clear.49 
The court noted that it found no case holding that a "re-
sponse which includes the statement required by Rule 36(a) may 
nonetheless be deemed an admission. "GO The court did find how-
ever that even when a party fails to state that it had made a 
reasonable inquiry, and thus fails to comply with the require-
ments of the rule, the "courts generally order an amended an-
swer rather than deem the matter admitted."Gl Some courts 
have held a response to be insufficient if the answering party 
47. 669 F.2d at 1246. See Adley Express Co. v. Highway Truck Drivers and Helpers, 
Local No. 107, 349 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa. 1972). In Adley, the court stated that "it 
would appear that mere statement in the answer that the answering party has made 
reasonable inquiry and that the information solicited was insufficient to enable him to 
admit or deny the requested matter will suffice." 349 F. Supp. at 451-52. But the court 
continued: "[w)e are not confronted with the mere statement of the union that it con-
ducted a reasonable inquiry ... ; on the contrary, it is apparent from the answer that 
the union had attempted to procure the information nece88ary to admit or deny." [d. at 
452. 
In Asea, there was evidence which suggested that the defendant either had "suffi-
cient information to admit or deny the requested admi88ions at the time it submitted its 
answers to [plaintiff), or that it subsequently discovered sufficient information to require 
it to amend its answers." See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(e)(2)(B). However the record would not 
necessarily support a finding that the defendant failed to make a reasonable inquiry. 669 
F.2d at 1247. 
48. The Advisory Committee's Note states: 
The revised rule requires only that the answering party make 
reasonable inquiry and secure such knowledge and informa-
tion as are readily obtainable by him. In most instances, the 
investigation will be necessary either to his own case or to 
preparation for rebuttal. Even when it is not, the information 
may be close enough at hand to be "readily obtainable". 
48 F.R.D. at 533. 
49. The Advisory Committee's Note continues: "Rule 36 requires only that the party 
state that he has taken these steps. The sanction for failure of a party to inform himself 
before he answers lies in the award of costs after trial, as provided in Rule 37(c)." [d. See 
supra note 41. 
50. 669 F.2d at 1246. 
1i1. [d. See City of Rome v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 378, 383-84 (D. D.C. 1978), 
afl'd, 446 U.S. 156 (1980) (court ordered party to serve amended answers within five days 
of the date of the order); Alexander v. Rizzo, 52 F.R.D. 235, 236 (E.D. Pa. 1971) ("If the 
Court determines that the answer does not comply with the Rule it may order either 
that the matter is admitted or that an amended answer be served.") (emphasis in origi-
nal) (court ordered amended answers). 
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fails to make a reasonable inquiry, but have ordered amended 
answers rather than deem the matters admitted, even if the in-
formation necessary to admit or deny was readily obtainable.1I2 
To this extent, courts have conditioned denials of motions to or-
der matters admitted on the answering party's timely submis-
sion of a sufficient response. liS 
With this background, the Asea court addressed the crux of 
the appeal-was it proper for the district court to order the mat-
ters admitted even though the defendant's responses literally 
fell within the mandates of Rule 36? The court stated that in its 
view, "permitting a party to avoid admitting or denying a proper 
request for admission simply by tracking the language of Rule 
36(a) would encourage additional abuse of the discovery pro-
cess."114 Such a response, if deemed to be adequate, would have 
, the deleterious result of permitting the answering party to shield 
himself from making an admission, and in most cases, from the 
award of sanctions. The court reasoned that 
Since a district court may order that a matter is 
admitted only if an answer does not 'comply' with 
the requirements of the Rule, it could be argued 
that the only sanction for a party's willful disre-
gard of its obligation to make reasonable inquiry 
would be an award of the expenses of proving the 
matter at trial pursuant to Rule 37(c).1111 
However, such a holding would emasculate the power of the 
court and reduce the litigant's obligation to make a reasonable 
inquiry into the information available to him. liS The court there-
fore held that a response which fails to admit or deny a proper 
request for admission does not comply with the requirements of 
the rule if the party in fact failed to make a reasonable inquiry 
or if information readily available is sufficient to enable him to 
admit or deny the matter.1I7 
52. [d. See Madison v. Mississippi Medicaid Comm'n, 86 F.R.D. 178, 186 (N.D. 
Miss. 1980); Webb v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 81 F.R.D. 431 (E.D. Pa. 1978); 
Lumpkin v. Meskill, 64 F.R.D. 673,678-80 (D.C. Conn. 1974) (answering party ordered 
to make reasonable inquiry before amending response). 
53. See, e.g., Lumpkin v. Meskill, 64 F.R.D. 673, 680 (D.C. Conn. 1974); Havenfield 
Corp. v. H & R Block, Inc., 67 F.R.D. 93, 97 (W.D. Mo. 1973). 
54. 669 F.2d at 1246. 
55. [d. See supra note 41. 
56. 669 F.2d at 1246-47. 
57. [d. at 1247. 
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If a propounding party feels that the answering party has 
not exercised its duty to make a reasonable inquiry in good 
faith, he may move to have the court determine the sufficiency 
of the answer, compel a proper response, or have the matter or-
dered admitted. The court noted that a district court should 
ordinarily first order an amended answer, and deem the matter 
admitted only if a sufficient answer is not timely filed. It added 
that the severe sanction of ordering a matter admitted still lies 
within the sound discretion of the district court and could be 
imposed when it is demonstrated that a party has intentionally 
disregarded the obligations imposed by Rule 36(a).118 
Applying this standard, the court found that the trial court 
deemed admitted certain key matters to the case although the 
trial record did not disclose any evidence showing that the de-
fendant had failed to make a reasonable inquiry or that informa-
tion readily obtainable was sufficient to allow it to admit or deny 
the particular requests. liS The court vacated the order and re-
manded for the limited purpose of reconsideration of the order 
deeming the requests admitted and the filing of appropriate 
findings of fact.60 
Asea v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. serves as a 
warning to attorneys to keep in mind the boundaries of their 
good faith posture with respect to their duty of reasonable in-
quiry. The defendant in Asea was fortunate in that the district 
court did not properly support with facts its findings of law. M-
ter Asea however, even a questionable breach of the duty of rea-
sonable inquiry may support an order deeming these requests 
admitted. 
58. [d. See David v. Hooker, Ltd., 560 F.2d 412, 418 (9th Cir. 1977) ("[bJy the very 
nature of its language, sanction imposed under Rule 37(b) must be left to the sound 
discretion of the trial judge."), quoting Von Brimer v. Whirlpool Corp., 536 F.2d 838, 844 
(9th Cir. 1976); Herrin v. Blackman, 89 F.R.D. 622, 623 (W.O. Tenn. 1981) (magistrate 
erred as a matter of law in holding that defendant's failure to file response to request for 
admissions within prescribed time resulted in automatic conclusion that requests would 
be deemed admitted). 
59. 669 F.2d at 1247. 
60. Id. 
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